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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the present study was to determine if the change in 
the Criminal Code which replaced the old offence of "rape" with the new 
offence of "sexual assault" had the desired effect of having sexual 
assault treated similar to physical assault. For this evaluation, five 
sexual assault cases and 22 physical assault cases were compared on the 
severity of the charge, the nature of the courtroom process and on the 
conviction and sentencing patterns. In addition, reporting, founding, 
clearing and charging rates before and after the new law were 
statistically compared. 
Findings indicated that both sexual and physical assault cases 
were under-charged. Although both sexual and physical assault victims 
had a negative trial experience, the trial experience of sexual assault 
victims was more negative with regard to the issue of consent. In 
addition, sexual assault cases were convicted significantly less often 
than physical assault cases. 
The number of Criminal Code offences reported and the percentage 
founded, cleared and charged in 1983 were compared to the means of the 
1973-1982 data to determine whether the change in "rape" to "sexual 
assault" had the desired effect of increasing the percentage of sexual 
assaults brought to justice. Findings indicated that there was a 
significant increase in the percentage of total sexual assaults cleared 
and charged for 1933. Both sexual and physical assault had a similar 
percentage charged for 1983. However, the percentage of total sexual 
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assaults founded and cleared for 1933 was significantly lower than the 
percentage of physical assaults founded and cleared. 
The findings that physical assault cases were in some ways treated 
as negatively as sexual assault cases by the criminal justice system 
calls into question why Bill C-127 equated rape to physical assault. 
The few changes that did take place under Bill C-127 were likened to 
token changes since there was still a greater percentage of physical 
than sexual assaults founded and cleared and sexual assault victims 
continued to face an ordeal in court. It was concluded that this served 
to confirm the belief in a just world despite all evidence to the 
contrary. It appears from this study that in practice Bill C-127 is not 
presently fulfilling the expectations of its intent. However, no 
conclusive appraisal can be made of Bill C-127 as it is relatively new 
and untried. Further monitoring of Bill C-127 in the courts is 
recommended to ensure that justice is served. 
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Introduction 
On January 4th 1984, the new bill, Bill C-127, on sexual offences 
became effective. The primary focus of Bill C-127 was the change in 
terminology of "sexual offences" to "sexual assault", and the 
recognition of the violent nature of these offences. The bill equates 
sexual offences to assaults and states that they should be treated as 
any other crime. It redefines rape and indecent assault and 
restructures other assaults. 
Sexual offences under Bill C-127 are placed into three categories; 
simple sexual assault, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and 
aggravated sexual assault. Sexual assault connotes any form of sexual 
activity such as kissing, fondling or sexual intercourse without the 
victim's consent. Simple sexual assault, that is, any form of sexual 
activity, can be handled as either a summary offence ($500 fine or up 
to two years imprisonment or both) or as an indictable offence (up to 
life imprisonment). Sexual assault causing bodily harm, that is, any 
substantial hurt to the health and comfort of the victim can result in 
up to 14 years imprisonment. Aggravated sexual assault which is any 
wounding, maiming or disfiguring of the victim can result in as much as 
life imprisonment. 
Bill C-127 also aims to reduce the legal harrassment experienced 
by the victim. Under the old rape laws, the victim's sexual history was 
often exposed by the defense in an effort to discredit the victim. Bill 
C-127 does not allow the discussion of the victim's reputation in 
court. However, if there is a question about the victim's sexual 
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activity with-the accused, the accused must give notice of relevant 
evidence. The judge must then hold a private hearing which excludes the 
jury and the public. The hearing is set to investigate whether the 
accused intends to use the evidence properly. The only proper purposes 
would be if the prosecution has already stated the victim's sexual 
activity as questionable, or if the identity of the accused is in 
question, or if the accused holds that the victim consented. 
Bill C-127 is a radical departure from the old rape laws, in that 
it eliminates the need for corroboration. That is, no evidence is 
required to confirm the victim's story. Furthermore, there is also no 
need for the victim to complain about the assault as soon as it 
happens. Thus, recency of complaint is no longer necessary to support 
the validity of the victim's story. The new bill also allows the victim 
the request of public anonymity in terms of publishing and 
broadcasting. Another major change in Bill C-127 is that spouses can 
now be charged for rape. 
The intentions of Bill C-127 were to remove the stigma associated 
with rape by changing the terminology to sexual assault, thus 
emphasizing the violent rather than the sexual nature of rape. In 
addition, it was hoped that this would result in more victims reporting 
the rape, and consequently in greater rates of conviction (Canadian 
Department of Justice, 1984). 
Bill C-127 was initiated as a result of feedback received from the 
Law Reform Commission of Canada (1980), the Advisory Council on the 
Status of Women (1976) and from popular outrage voiced by various 
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women's publications, such as Ms. Magazine, Chatelaine and McLeans. Due 
to the considerable social stigma and gruelling legal procedures facing 
rape victims, reports of rape were estimated to be as low as one in 
ten. Even of those rapes considered valid by the police and then taken 
to court, the conviction rates in court were less than 50%. This 
conviction rate of rape was found to be much lower than the typical 
rates of 86% for all other criminal offences (Renner and Warner, 1981). 
In order to understand why the old rape laws were revoked and why 
Bill C-127 was designed to treat rape as an act of violence (i.e., as 
an assault rather than as a "sexual" offence), it is necessary to 
review the history of rape and how the belief in a just world has 
resulted in a legal and social process of blaming the victim. 
History of Rape 
1. Women as Forms of Private Property 
Clark and Lewis (1977) have provided an explicit theoretical 
framework for explaining the social causes of rape and the social 
function of rape laws. They explain that the historical development of 
the system of privately owned property resulted in unequal distribution 
of property. Legal, social and economic inequality between men and 
women evolved as an increasing awareness of property rights developed. 
The specific form of this inequality made women the objects rather than 
the subjects of private rights. Thus, women were among the forms of 
private property owned and controlled by individual men. 
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Women's economic status was determined by that of their fathers or 
husbands and they were only recognized for their sexual and 
reproductive capacities. Clark and Lewis (1977) discuss how the 
emergence of a system of individually owned private property 
necessitated a mechanism for transfering accumulated private property 
from one generation to another. 
One mechanism was through biological inheritance, that is, male 
property owners attained certainty of paternity by having exclusive 
access to the sexual and reproductive capacities of one or more women. 
Women and children were thus perceived as forms of private property 
allowing men to control inheritance of property. 
Marriage was also another mechanism to facilitate the transference 
of property. It gave the husband exclusive sexual right over his wife 
and became the basis for the law in Canada prior to 1983 which stated 
that a husband could not rape his wife (i.e., she could not refuse 
sex). 
Along with marriage law, rape law was also developed as a 
mechanism for transfering property. By the end of the sixth century, 
Anglo-Saxon law dictated that rape was punished by orders to pay 
compensation and reparation to the woman's father or husband, since he 
was the person who was regarded as having been wronged by the act. 
Technically, in a legal sense, rape was simply theft of sexual property 
since women and their sexual and reproductive capacities were owned by 
men. The punishment for rape was assessed by the economic position of 
the rape victim and her corresponding status as marriageable property. 
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Our modern criminal concept of rape began in the Middle Ages as a 
response to the problem of "bride capture". That is, sexual intercourse 
with a woman was regarded as establishing ownership of a woman through 
marriage. Rape laws were designed to prevent the illegitimate transfers 
of property through marriages established this way. Thus, the social 
function of rape laws was the protection and preservation of 
patrimonial property, both in the form of real property, and in the 
forms of desirable female sexual property (Clark and Lewis, 1977). 
Clark and Lewis (1977) also discuss the commoditization of female 
sexuality. Women who voluntarily gave up an exclusive sexual 
relationship lost their desirability as private property and were seen 
as "common property". Thus any man could use them without penalty. 
According to Clark and Lewis (1977), rape laws were never meant to 
protect all women from rape, nor to provide women with any guaranteed 
right to sexual autonomy. They were designed to preserve valuable 
female sexual property for the exclusive ownership of those men who 
could afford to acquire it. 
"...the present treatment and handling of rape 
and rape victims within the Canadian criminal 
justice system does not arise from any 
malfunction in the administration of the law or 
any gross bias on the part of those who 
administer the system. Given the conceptual 
framework out of which rape laws developed, and 
within which rape evolved as a criminal offence, 
the results are exactly what we would 
expect"(Clark and Lewis, 1977, p.124). 
They conclude that it is the existing system of inequalities that has 
resulted in the creation and propagation of rape. 
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2. Just World Hypothesis: Victimization and Double Victimization 
It is the belief in the just world hypothesis which sustains the 
existing system of inequalities and results in the victimization of 
women. Society's inability to deal with the unjust treatment of women 
not only results in derogating women but also in self-blaming by women. 
In a study by Lerner and Simmons (1966), female subjects watched a 
fellow student react with apparent pain to series of supposed electric 
shocks. They were led to believe that they were participating in a 
human learning experiment and that the victim was receiving the shocks 
as punishment for her errors. In one condition, subjects had an 
opportunity to compensate the victim by voting to reassign her to a 
reward condition in which she would receive money rather than shocks. 
In this condition, subjects were actually able to restore justice. 
R.esults indicated that most subjects took advantage of this opportunity 
to compensate the victim. 
In another condition, however, subjects were only told that the 
victim's suffering would continue. When asked to evaluate the victim at 
this point, subjects in the victim-compensated condition, rated the 
victim more favorably than did the subjects in the victim-uncompensated 
condition, in which the justice was presumably greater. This tendency 
was strong in a third condition, where the subjects were led to believe 
that the victim had allowed herself to be shocked for the sake of the 
subjects and the experimenter (Lerner and Simmons, 1966). 
"It seemed, therefore, that the sight of the 
innocent person suffering without the possibility 
of reward or compensation motivated people to 
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devalue the attractiveness of the victim in order 
to bring about a more appropriate fit between her 
fate and her character. This general finding has 
been replicated a number of times with diverse 
populations (see e.g., Simons & Pilavin, 1972; 
Sorrentino & Hardy, 1973; Johnson & Dickinson, 
Note 1; Pilavin, Hardyck, & Vadim, Note 
2)."(Lerner and Miller, 1978, p.1032). 
The above findings emphasize the sense of responsibility and 
ensuing guilt of the subjects in relation to the unjust treatment of 
the victim. This issue of complicity and guilt was further explored by 
Lerner (1971a, Study 3). It was found that even when the condition of 
active participation by subjects was removed, subjects from another 
department, who had merely observed the victim's suffering still tended 
to derogate the victim. 
According to Lerner (1970) individuals tend to perceive the world 
as a just place. That is, individuals develop a sense of deservingness 
and in order to believe in this, they need to believe that others also 
get what they deserve in the world. This belief enables individuals to 
confront their environment as if it was stable and orderly. Since the 
belief develops out of a cognitive and a motivational context, Lerner 
(1970) reasoned that without this belief individuals would be 
incapacitated. Thus, the belief that the world is just serves an 
important adaptive function for individuals and they are consequently 
reluctant to give up this belief. 
As the above studies on the just world hypothesis indicate, 
individuals confronted with evidence to the contrary feel a need to 
protect their belief in a just world. Consequently both justices and 
unjustices are accounted for within this framewprk to be logical and 
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orderly consequences of a given action. 
According to Lerner (1970) the justness of others' fate has 
implications for the future of the individual's own fate. That is, if 
others can suffer unjustly, then the individual must admit that he too 
may suffer unjustly. Lerner (1970) concludes that as a consequence of 
the perceived interdependence between their own fate and the fate of 
others, individuals will be motivated to restore justice by either 
compensating or rewarding the victim. In this way, they are reducing or 
eliminating the implied potential threat to themselves. 
Where compensation or reward could not be given to the victim, 
individuals who either witnessed or participated in a situation where 
the victim was treated unjustly, felt a sense of responsibility and 
guilt. To restore their belief in a just world, individuals resorted to 
blaming the victim for her own fate. That is, they derogated the 
victim's character or behavior so as to confirm that no injustice was 
done (Lerner, 1970). 
According to Ryan (1971), the treatment of oppressed and 
disadvantaged groups is often justified by maintaining that they 
deserve their fate. He argues that this process results in blaming the 
victim. With regard to rape, it is the first victimization. Double 
victimization results when society blames the rape victim for the rape, 
and when women internalize the responsibility for rape and blame 
themselves. 
According to Weiss and Borges (1973), both the term and concept of 
victimization refer to societal processes that before, during and after 
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the event simultaneously render the victim defenseless and even partly 
responsible for it. They argue that victimization includes the 
preparation of the victim for the crime, the experience during the 
crime, and the treatment and responses encountered as part of the 
aftermath of the crime. With regard to rape, if these processes of 
victimization are successful, the raped woman then is a "legitimate" or 
"safe" victim who will not be dangerous to the rapist, since she may 
not report the rape. Weiss and Borges (1973) state that because society 
does not allow the raped woman to play the usual role of a legitimate 
victim, rape in some sense becomes almost a victimless crime. They add 
that if, in addition, the rapist cannot be accused then the crime of 
rape is robbed of its necessary elements: an obvious victim and an 
offender. 
Weiss and Borges (1973) discuss that rape research is often based 
on the assumption that the raped victim is psychologically different 
from others. It is the maintenance of this bias in the findings of such 
research that serves to justify the status of the raped woman as a 
legitimate victim and reinforces a rationale for the manner in which 
society treats her. 
According to Weiss and Borges (1973), victimology tends to 
overemphasize the victims share of responsibility. The study of rape 
illustrates how victimology can become the art of blaming the victim, 
thereby adding insult to injury. For example, Amir (1971) actually 
states that "In a way, the victim is always the cause of the 
crime..."(Amir, 1971, p.258). 
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Victimization becomes double victimization for the rape victim 
through the rejection and accusations from society's legal and social 
processes. According to Hartwig and Sandler (1977), the victim enters a 
system dominated by male values which not only does not take the crime 
seriously and may believe the victim was to blame, but which is also 
prepared to regard her testimony with the greatest skepticism. They 
conclude that society is overly preoccupied by the possibility of false 
rape accusations. 
The victimization of the rape victim is emphasized in the 
definition below. 
"...Rape was seen as a crime of hostility and 
aggression. It is the ultimate act of 
objectification of the woman as a sexual being 
and is often experienced by her as a direct 
attack against her very personhood...A 
male-dominated society, with almost all positions 
of power and influence (in legislature; 
administration of law, and the schools of 
behavioral, medical and social science) occupied 
by men, tends to establish and perpetuate the 
woman as a legitimate object for 
victimization"(Weiss and Borges, 1973, p.107). 
Therefore, rape is an act of violence and assault rather than of sexual 
gratification. The difficulty in seeing rape as sexual, and the need 
for reform are reflected in the evidence of double victimization as 
experienced by the rape victim. 
Current Statistical Evidence of Need for Legal Reform 
Wood (1975) argues that the bias within the legal system and the 
accompanying emotional trauma results in victims often failing to 
report rape. Thus, the victim may choose to keep her victimization a 
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\ secret in order to avoid the ordeal of the trial. 
-^ Haines (1975) adds that most lawyers, judges and those experienced 
in the trial of rape would tell a female relative not to complain if 
she were raped because the trial can be often more traumatic than the 
original assault. If the complaint is made, the victim may have to face 
the fact that the court may find the accused not guilty because of lack 
of corroboration or because of reasonable doubt. Haines (1975) 
concludes that it is easy to accept the fact that rape is the least 
reported crime and, therefore, the most successful since the victim 
does not complain. It seems that the rights of the accused are upheld 
at the expense of the victim. 
The fact that rape is under-reported and that there are few 
convictions is also noted by Bray (1979), Brooks (1975), Cooper and 
Weinberg (1978), Clark and Lewis (1977) and Boyle (1969). Boyle (1969) 
compares rape to blackmail, in that, if the victim reports it then she 
has to face the consequences, if she does not report it, she makes it 
one of her best kept secrets. In the latter case she may be raped again 
by the same rapist. 
Brooks (1975) discusses that the number of rapes has increased 
more rapidly in the last few years than has any other crime against the 
person. The number of rapes that are reported compared to the number in 
which suspects are arrested and brought to trial is lower than the rate 
for any other crime against the person. 
Cooper and Weinberg (1978) report that rape is the least convicted 
and fastest rising violent crime in North America today. While, 
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estimates on the reporting rate for rape vary from five percent to 40%, 
most experts agree that only between 10% and 20% of all rapes are 
reported to the authorities. It is also noted that when only reported 
rapes are considered the conviction rates are still quite low since 
between 40% and 60% of all reported rapes are "unfounded" by the 
police, usually because of prosecutional difficulties such as prior 
relationship between victim and assailant or questionable behavior by 
the victim. Therefore, these cases are not further pursued. 
Clark and Lewis (1977) maintain that even in rape cases where 
charges are laid, and no witnesses drop out before the trial, the 
Canadian conviction rate is only 42%. By comparison, Metropolitan 
Toronto, under these same conditions has a conviction rate of 18%, 
whereas the general Canadian conviction rate is 86%. They argue that 
even in sentencing practices, Canadian society appears to tolerate rape 
since the average sentence for rape is about four to five years, which 
means an actual jail term of about 18 to 24 months. In comparison, the 
average sentences for robbery conviction rate is much higher. 
Therefore, legally and socially, rape is considered a less serious 
crime than robbery. 
The Canadian Urban Victimization Survey (1983) found that for the 
year 1981, there were more than 700,000 personal victimizations of 
people over 16 (sexual assault, robbery, assault, and theft of personal 
property). Women were about seven times more likely than men to be 
victims of sexual assault (including rape, attempted rape, sexual 
molesting and attempted sexual molesting). The American Crime 
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Statistics (1933) also revealed women as more affected by the violent 
crime of rape and as more vulnerablethan men to assaults by 
acquaintances and relatives. 
Among reasons cited in the Canadian Urban Victimizatin Survey 
(1983), for non-report, 52% felt that police could not help them in any 
way. This response was closely followed by 43% of respondents, who 
expressed concern about the attitude of police or courts toward this 
type of incident. In contrast, for other crimes, concern about attitude 
as a reason for failing to report was given by only 8% of victims. One 
third cited fear of revenge as a reason for non-report, particularly if 
assaulted by intimates. 
"In fact, women are somewhat more likely to 
report attempted rape than completed rape. The 
moral stigma many rape victims fear (and 
experience) may not apply to the same extent to 
victims of attempted rape. Reporting may 
therefore be less stressful for attempted rape 
victims than for victims of completed rapes."(The 
Canadian Urban Victimization Survey, 1983, p.6) 
In comparison, the American findings for unreported violent crimes 
indicated that 35% said it was a private or personal matter, 18% said 
that nothing could be done or there was lack of proof, 4% said that it 
was not important enough, 8% reported to someone else, 0-5% said police 
would not want to be bothered, 2% said it was too inconvenient, 16% 
feared reprisal, 2% did not give any reason and 42% gave all other 
reasons. However, the study failed to specify these reasons (American 
Crime Statistics, 1983). 
The rape statistics all reveal that rape is under-reported and the 
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least punished of all crimes. Thus, the statistical outcome of double 
victimization reveals that justice is not served. It will be relevant 
to find out in this research whether the introduction of Bill C-127 
results in changing the number of founded, cleared, charged and 
convicted cases of sexual assault. 
Social Process of Victimization 
1. Myths About Rape 
After the first victimization by the rapist, the victim then has 
to face society's victimization. The reception given to the victim by 
society's social and legal processes of justice is cruel indeed. This 
manifested cruelty is based upon myths and beliefs about rape that are 
harbored by society. 
According to the Advisory Council on the Status of Women (1976), 
rape is the most elusive crime. Not only is it the least reported and 
least punished offence but it can result in severe physical and 
psychological harm to the victim. The Council has done extensive 
studies in an attempt to explain why rape is so unpunished in society, 
and it finds that the answers lie within the law itself. 
"Laws are shaped to protect the beliefs of a 
society. In general, changes in the laws lag 
behind changes in society. This is particularly 
true in the case of Canada's rape laws because 
the concepts which shaped the laws in the first 
place have tenaciously persisted as the myths of 
today" (The Advisory Council on the Status of 
Women, 1976, p.4). 
15 
Rioux (1975) describes the whole issue of rape as more than simply 
a legal issue, since laws concerning rape and other sexual offences 
reflect the values of society. That is to say, the laws influence and 
are in turn influenced by these values. Myths about women and rape are 
held by all sectors of society, including those sectors involved in the 
reform of the legal system.-Myths exert strong influence on everyone. 
They are often internalized by women who then use these myths as a 
criteria by which to judge their own behavior. 
"-A woman with her skirt up can run faster than a 
man with his pants down. 
-A healthy woman cannot be raped by one man 
alone. 
-If you are going to rough up a woman, don't stop 
until you've raped her then they can't get you on 
assault. 
-If a woman is not a virgin, it doesn't matter 
anyhow. 
-In most cases "No" really means "Yes". It simply 
takes a woman longer to become aroused and as 
soon as she is you can be sure she will say 
yes."(Rioux, 1975, p.11). 
As Rioux (1975) concludes, this clarifies the great lag existing 
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In law to express new social values and norms. There are a large number 
of myths surrounding rape which place the sexuality of women on a 
polarity of good and evil. Women are either good, chaste and modest, or 
they are evil, seductive and wanton. Many myths imply that if it can be 
shown that a woman is a sexual person, then she cannot logically, be a 
victim of rape. The reasoning seems to be that sex is sex (Rioux, 
1975). 
According to Rioux (1975), it is the retention of such myths, and 
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the belief that they are fact that is harmful in a number of ways. 
"When such myths masquerade as reality, it is 
difficult to get a jury which is not already 
prejudiced by such ideas and, therefore, 
regardless of the particular case, they will 
convict or clear a man on the basis of their 
preconceived notions on morality and rape. Thus 
they may really not be judging the case or 
circumstances in point"(Rioux, 1975, p.11). 
Rioux (1975) emphasizes that professionals involved in rape cases may 
also hold these views and thus perpetuate the myths and create stress 
for the victim if they act on the basis of these. This latter point is 
most serious when considering the fact that the legal system is also 
based on myths surrounding rape rather than on the crime itself. 
The Advisory Council on the Status of Women (1976) adds that 
society accepts the notion that women want to be raped and provoke 
rape. Thus laws are based on the supposed guilt of women. The idea of 
the willingness of women is exemplified in the very definition of rape 
since it is necessary for the court to prove that the woman's consent 
was not willingly given. This can be the downfall of the even the best 
prosecution, for according to the Council, the fact is that lack of 
consent is legally unprovable. 
According to Cooper and Weinberg (1978), there are other commonly 
held beliefs about rape and the consequences of rape that are also held 
by professionals helping rape victims. These result in victims not 
reporting or regretting that they reported the rape. 
Cooper and Weinberg (1978) argue that the assumption that all 
women become hysterical after a rape results in professionals forcing a 
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woman to express herself. This is experienced by victims as a 
continuation of the force of the rape itself. They stress that the 
victim should be allowed her own style of response. 
According to Cooper and Weinberg (1978), it is ludricous to assume 
that men are not responsible for their actions and feelings, since it 
is documented fact that most rapes are at least partially planned. Yet 
professionals attack the appearance and behavior of victims, 
especially, if there are little or no bruising. 
Another assumption that is commonly held is that rape is a sexual 
rather than a violent act. This results in victims being leered at and 
subjected to extensive questioning about the sexual aspects of the rape 
and about their own sexual histories. This assumption is based on the 
fact that the law defines rape as a sexual offence, rather than as an 
assault (Cooper and Weinberg, 1978). 
Ryan (1971) argues that even individuals with good intentions are 
conditioned to believe that certain things are true about the 
victimized and consequently accept the mythology of "blaming the 
victim". The rape victim is considered psychologically and physically 
responsible for the rape. Psychologically, she is judged to have 
underlying desires to be raped and physically she is judged to not have 
resisted enough. This process of "blaming the victim" is reinforced by 
the fact that some women have accepted responsibility for rape. It 
follows that the acceptance of responsibility by rape victims for the 
rape also serves to clarify their belief in a just world. 
18 
2. Current Beliefs and Interpretations of Rape 
Today, many myths about rape are being challenged, in part by fact 
and in part by a re-examination of attitudes, values and beliefs. 
Foremost is the belief that the act of rape is an act of sex and not an 
act of violence. 
Griffin (1975) describes rape as an act of aggression in which the 
victim is denied her self-determination. It is an act of violence which 
always carries with it the threat of death. Griffin (1975) argues that 
rape is a form of mass terrorism, since rape victims are chosen 
indiscriminately, but the propagandists for male supremacy broadcast 
that it is women who cause rape by being unchaste or in the wrong place 
at the wrong time, in essence by behaving as though they were free. 
According to Cooper and Weinberg (1978), the law perpetuates the 
attitude that rape is a sexual act by retaining rape as a sexual 
offence. Rape is experienced by the victim as a life-threatening 
situation, a violent rather than a sexual experience. 
"Because of the prurient nature of society's 
concern with all things perceived sexual, the 
public and legal focus on rape tends to be on the 
sexual aspect of the assault and not on the 
violence, both mental and physical, which is 
inflicted on the victim" (Babin, 1980, p.l). 
Babin (1980) points out that rape has been seen as a sexual act and the 
victim, by extension, has been seen as a participant in the rape. Thus, 
it is up to the victim to prove that she did not incite or consent to 
intercourse. 
The clinical analysis of rape by Fortune (1933) regards it as a 
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pseudosexual act since it has the appearance of sexual activity in that 
genital contact is involved. However, rape is only pseudosexual because 
it is committed in order to fulfill nonsexual needs related to power, 
anger, and aggression. That is, the primary motivations of the rapist 
are to dominate and control. These factors are also consistent with the 
victim's experience of sexual violence since the victim feels violated, 
dominated and powerless. Fortune (1983) continues that sexual assault 
is not a sexual experience and is very different from consensual sexual 
activity, it is an act done to the victim, against her will. 
Fortune (1983) explains that there are two positions held on the 
nature of rape: rape is violence, and rape is sex. 
"...While rape is sexual in nature as the term 
"sexual violence" makes clear, the grammatical 
arrangement of the term is crucial. The noun is 
"violence", the basic dynamic of the experience. 
The adjective is "sexual", describing the type of 
violence. While the mechanics of rape are sexual, 
the primary motivation is not; it is 
violence."(Fortune, 1983, p.15). 
The confusion between sexual activity and sexual violence is so deeply 
rooted in our culture that it is accepted as a part of human nature. 
The process of socialization incorporates the belief that there is no 
difference between sexual activity and sexual violence (Fortune, 1983). 
There are several erroneous beliefs that promote and sustain the 
confusion between sexual activity and sexual violence. One accepted 
belief is that anything that employs the sexual organs must be 
primarily sexual in nature and that the source of a man's sexual 
response is external and somehow beyond his control. Fortune (1983) 
maintains that this is known as "blaming the victim" since women are 
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held responsible for men's sexual response. 
The other widely accepted belief is that the "romantic love ideal" 
requires a dominant-subordinate relationship between two people. That 
is, in order for men to be aroused, they feel that they must be in 
control of the sexual interaction and that their partner should be 
passive and submissive. The other belief is that men have the 
prerogative to take what they want sexually regardless of the other's 
wishes (Fortune, 1983). 
Fortune (1983) concludes that as long as erroneous beliefs about 
male sexuality go unchallenged, the confusion between sexual activity 
and sexual violence will remain a predominant reality in our society 
and will continue to support the conditions which encourage sexual 
violence. 
Bill C-127 is based on the current belief that rape is experienced 
as a violent, and not a sexual, act. It is the first legal step which 
challenges the existing myths about rape. The fact that rape is defined 
as sexual assault and restructured similarly to physical assault, 
demonstrates the bill's aim of dealing with the social process of 
victimization, specifically, breaking the vicious cycle of blaming the 
rape victim for the rape. According to Ryan (1975), until the ideology 
of blaming the victim is exposed and destroyed, victimization will 
continue. 
Legal Process of Victimization 
It is the beliefs underlying the myths of rape that shape the 
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legal process of victimization. The trial of rape actually becomes a 
trial of the victim's character. According to Babin (1980), the key 
areas in a rape case in order of priority are consent, penetration and 
the identity of the accused. However, he argues that the trial focuses 
on personal attacks on the victim in the areas of (1) corroboration, 
(2) sexual history and (3) consent. 
Brooks (1975) notes that the ordeal faced by the victim in court 
is furthered by the fact that the jury must be instructed that it is 
dangerous to convict on the testimony of the rape victim alone; and the 
fact that in some American jurisdictions rape victims can be compelled 
to undergo a psychiatric examination before testifying. He also 
emphasizes that juries do not convict if it appears that the victim 
assumed a certain risk or deserved what she got, since their concept of 
victim precipitation is undoubtedly shaped by the traditional 
restrictive stereotypes of women. 
Haines (1975) questions why in a society devoted to the 
preservation of human dignity, a woman exposed to the ultimate 
violation of self, short of homicide, is compelled in court to endure 
such public suffering. According to Haines (1975), the answers lie in 
our laws which have been evolved and administered by men who have never 
been raped. 
Cooper and Weinberg (1978) emphasize the destructive influences 
the crown attorney and the court system itself can have on the victim. 
They argue that most people are essentially naive about the judicial 
system, although they believe in law and justice. Few realize the 
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impersonal, dehumanizing impact of the legal machine, or that the "game 
of the law" has very little to do with "justice". For the rape victim, 
these revelations occur at a time when she is psychologically least 
prepared. 
According to Cooper and Weinberg (1978), the victim learns the 
hard way that the law is a "game" and that she is but a mere pawn. The 
victim thus feels the continuation of the helplessness and 
powerlessness she felt in the rape itself. 
"...the woman victim, struggling to regain some 
sense of control over her life is repeatedly told 
that she has none, if not in so many words then 
by actions. As the victim struggles to 
externalize her anger she is repeatedly 
mistreated by the system supposed to protect her. 
If she becomes angry with her official 
oppressors—often the only legitimate 
response—she threatens her own case. If she does 
not, to preserve her position as a "good" victim, 
she sacrifices her own emotional 
stability"(Cooper and Weinberg, 1978, p.173). 
Thus it is verified that society nakes the victim pay for her rape. 
This ordeal is furthered by the fact that the legal process may last 
for years. 
The legal ordeal is furthered by the fact that the defendant 
obtains, or at public expense is provided with, a lawyer almost 
immediately. However, the victim must rely on the state to prosecute 
the case. She has no lawyer of her own unless she hires one at her own 
expense. In any case, such a lawyer would have no legal standing and no 
role in the court process. Often the victim cannot even find out who 
her crown attorney will be until a week or two before she goes to 
court. She may even meet that lawyer for the first time at court. While 
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the defence has up to a year to prepare its case for trial, the 
prosecutor will be assigned to the case for a period of one week to one 
month (Cooper and Weinberg, 1978). 
Therefore, it is during the legal process of justice that the 
victim makes extensive payments for the rape. As has been seen, the 
social process of victimization feeds the belief of blaming the rape 
victim for the rape. Therefore, in court the victim must clearly show 
that she was not responsible for the rape. This she must do by facing 
the cross-examination designed to challenge her on corroboration, 
sexual history and consent. 
1. Corroboration in a Rape Trial 
According to Hartwig and Sandler (1977), concerns about the 
victim's testimony have resulted in corroboration requiring proof of 
force, penetration, and a witness to connect the defendant with the 
criminal occurrence. In the case of rape, these three facts have made 
it almost impossible for convictions to be obtained. 
Weinstein (1977) maintains that the need for corroboration is the 
most oppressive clause for the victim. That a woman must struggle 
during a rape to the point of exhaustion or imminent fear of death 
presents a dilemma for the victim and the court. If the victim fears 
bodily harm and chooses to act passively, the court has to decide 
whether this was basis for "consent". There will be little evidence of 
resistance when a victim is held and raped at gunpoint. Weinstein 
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(1977) questions how a prosecutor can contend that the rape had even 
occurred, if the rapist and the weapon cannot be found. Weinstein 
(1977) concludes that while corroboration is needed for a rape 
prosecution, it is not required for other serious crimes, including 
physical assault, which can be easily falsified. 
Hartwig and Sandler (1977) argue that few would expect a robbery 
victim to engage in a life-death struggle with the attacker. They 
maintain that force is often difficult to prove. Minor bruises on a 
victim have often been attributed to vigorous love-making. In these 
cases, it is merely a matter of the word of the accused against the 
word of the victim. 
Penetration is easier to prove than force, although it excludes 
forms of other coerced sexual activity. For evidence, the presence of 
semen stains has more recently been considered sufficient evidence. 
Unfortunately, after being raped, the victim often feels "dirtied" and 
may bathe immediately. In doing so, the evidence for this point of 
corroboration is washed away (Hartwig and Sandler, 1977). 
The corroboration of a witness is difficult to obtain since most 
rapes occur in places where subjects cannot be seen or heard and even 
if a witness is obtained, attempts will be made to discredit the 
testimony in court (Hartwig and Sandler, 1977). 
It is relevant to note the study by Hans and Brooks (1978) 
researching the effects of corroboration instructions on the jury. By 
giving different groups of experimental juries different instructions 
about the issue of corroboration, they attempted to determine in what 
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manner corroboration instructions affected simulated juries. 
It was assumed that men and women might take different 
perspectives, the men being more concerned about false charges and the 
women more concerned about restitution for the victim. Brownmiller 
(1975) notes the fact that this sort of reasoning has been used to 
justify the prevalence of all male or primarily male juries in rape 
cases. However, surprisingly few sex differences were found in this 
research. The assumption that a jury will focus more on corroborative 
evidence and question the victim's credibility more when given 
corroboration instructions was also not confirmed. Hans and Brooks 
(1978) conclude that corroboration instructions do not appear to affect 
jury deliberations in the intended manner. 
Brooks (1975) states the following as justifications for 
corroboration: the victim's testimony is considered unreliable and 
difficult to evaluate because it is often alleged that there are more 
false rape charges made, and it is also argued that many of the reasons 
leading women to falsely accuse are not apparent to the jury, which 
therefore might be misled by the victim's testimony. Jurors may also 
hold the victim's behavior as questionable and believe that she 
deserved what she got. In addition, there is a fear that a jury may 
become too sympathetic towards the victim or that the defendant may 
lack supporting evidence and thus it is the defendant's word against 
the victim's. 
According to Weinstein (1977), the fact that corroboration was 
created as insurance for males against false rape charges implied that 
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women could not be trusted or acknowledged to possess any conception of 
law and morality. 
"...Even though there is no corroboration 
required in these thirty-five states, records 
show that almost every case brought before a 
judge and jury has some corroborating testimony. 
Our judicial system is based on the assumption of 
innocence in a given case. No judge or jury will 
convict a man on the victim's testimony alone, 
without some credible evidence of foul play" 
(Weinstein, 1977, p.31). 
In the above criticism of New York's rape laws, it is noted that, 
although there is a severe twenty-five year penalty, the adopted rules 
of evidence make it almost impossible to condemn the crime through the 
law. Thus, the law reveals ambivalence towards rape and is oppressive 
to victims. 
Bill C-127 eliminates the need for corroboration in an effort to 
affirm that women can be trusted under oath. However, considering 
Weinstein's observation, one of the objectives of this research is to 
observe whether corroboration is indeed still required in sexual 
assault trials. The same will be done for physical assault trials in 
order to evaluate if the intent of the bill to treat rape similarly to 
assault is realized in the legal system. 
2. Sexual History in a Rape Trial 
Bias against the rape victim in the legal system is especially 
pronounced in the cross-examination focusing on the reputation and the 
sexual history of the rape victim. In this cross-examination, if the 
moral character of the victim can be made to appear socially 
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undesirable, then the assumption could be made that a victim of this 
nature is likely to have consented. Evidence of the victim having prior 
sexual relations, dating or mere acquaintance with the accused may also 
be used to assume that the victim may not have seriously opposed the 
accused (Wood, 1975). 
According to Wood (1975), the victim must endure personal attacks 
during the cross-examination in court. Defence lawyers often initiate 
the case by inquiring as to the number of men with whom the victim has 
had intercourse. They then make her go over the details of the rape, 
while insinuating that she is mistaken as to the identity of the 
accused or that she consented. Thus it appears that no heed is paid to 
the fact that the prosecutrix is the victim, and therefore should not 
be subjected to any more duress than required. 
Haines (1975) notes that defence lawyers realize that a jury is 
very selective in enforcing the law and thus they engage in character 
assassination when questioning the victim. As the defence questions 
below indicate, this procedure, can be devastating to the case of the 
victim. 
"1. Were you on the pill? 
2. Have you ever had an illegitimate child? 
3. Have you ever had an abortion? 
4. How old were you when you first had sexual 
intercourse? 
5. With how many men have you had sexual 
intercourse? 
6. Have you had sexual intercourse with X, with 
Y, etc.? 
7. Do you have sexual problems? 
8. Do you smoke marijuana? Do you take drugs? 
9. Are you married to the man with whom you are 
living?" 
(Haines, 1975, p.57). 
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As Haines (1975) points out, the range of questions is only limited by 
the ingenuity of counsel and the interference of the judge. 
According to Brooks (1975), questioning the victim about her 
sexual history can last for hours and result in total humiliation. This 
is likened to a trial of the victim's character rather than of the 
guilt of the accused. Judges permit this questioning to show the 
veracity of the victim as a witness and consider it relevant to the 
issue of consent. 
"These judges reason that if the victim admits 
some form of previous sexual conduct it can be 
inferred that she is a woman of bad moral 
character. If she is an immoral person then it 
can be inferred that she is a person who would 
not have conscientious scruples about lying in 
the witness box. That is to say, some judges 
appear to reason that if a woman consents to 
sexual intercourse outside of marriage then she 
is a person who would also lie. This reasoning, 
based as it is on a causal relationship between 
sexual conduct and veracity, reflects a rather 
primitive notion of human behavior" (Brooks, 
1975, p.5). 
' Thus it is reasoned that if a woman has consented to intercourse in the 
past then she is the kind of person who consents to intercourse and, 
therefore, she probably consented on the occasion in question. 
Brooks (1975) relates that research on the effects of giving 
information on the victim's character to juries results in pardoning 
the accused even though they have found him guilty. Hartwig and Sandler 
(1977) also note this and states that jurors may well reflect 
attitudes about appropriate female behavior. Babin (1900) adds that 
questionable conduct on the victim's part is usually treated as a 
reason for some reduction in sentence even if the accused is convicted. 
Rioux (1975) notes that the character of the accused is not an 
issue in the trial unless the accused puts it in issue. This he may do 
in order to present evidence of his own good character. The prosecution 
is only allowed to question the accused if he chooses to become a 
witness in his own defence. Thus, if the accused has been previously 
convicted for rape, it need never be known in court. According to the 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women (1976), this reflects society's 
double standard. Interestingly, for simulated jury studies on rape, 
results indicate that admission of previous similar convictions does 
increase the chance of a guilty verdict (L.S.E. Jury Project, 1973). 
Rioux (1975), in a personal account of a preliminary hearing of a 
rape case, notes that the victim's character was brought into question 
on a number of points. 
"...In some instances the actual wording of the 
question suggested moral evaluation; in others, 
and this is perhaps more serious since it would 
not be evident from a typed transcript of the 
case, it was the tone of voice of the defence 
lawyer or his facial expression (raising of 
evaluation."(Rioux, 1975, p.23). 
Rioux (1975) concludes that such lines of questioning will be pursued 
in greater depth if the case actually goes to trial. 
Bill C-127 does not allow the cross-examination on the victim's 
sexual history. One of the objectives of the bill is to redirect the 
rape trial so that it becomes what it should be, a trial of the guilt 
of the accused rather than a trial of the victim's character. Rioux's 
observation gives serious concern since moral evaluation in the 
cross-examination may be effected indirectly. Thus, the trial may still 
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latently be a trial of the victim's character. One purpose of the 
present study is to determine whether under Bill C-127 the victim's 
sexual history still becomes an issue in the trial. Again, this will 
similarly be done for physical assault trials as a comparison. 
3. Consent in a Rape Trial 
Leggett (1973) states that cross-examination of the victim's past 
sexual history, especially, with regard to prior relations with the 
accused always leads to the question of consent. According to Brooks 
(1975), the identity of the accused is sometimes the central issue in a 
rape trial, but more often the fact in issue is whether or not the 
victim consented to the intercourse which the accused admits took 
place. 
"On charges of sexual offence, such as rape...it 
is the practice to instruct the jury that it is 
unsafe to convict on the uncorroborated evidence 
of the alleged victim. There is sound reason for 
this, because sexual cases are particularly 
subject to the danger of deliberately false 
charges, resulting from sexual neurosis, 
phantasy, jealously, spite, or simply a girl's 
refusal to admit that she consented to an act of 
which she is now ashamed."(Williams, 1962, 
p.662). 
According to the Advisory Council on the Status of Women (1976), the 
cross-examination of the victim on consent should not be used to 
undermine the victim's credibility-as seems to be the drift in the 
rather biased quote above. 
Wood (1975) affirms that character evidence which is allowed on 
the issue of consent should not be admitted since it is prejudicial to 
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the victim. The victim may not have provoked the rape and may have a 
good reputation but still the jury may acquit the accused if it feels 
that she did not show enough resistance and that she may have 
consented. 
The American Crime Statistics (1983) reveal that rape victims as 
compared to other violent crime victims are more likely to use force, 
try a verbal response, or attract attention, and less likely than 
others to do nothing to protect themselves. In addition, physical 
assault victims are the most likely to attempt some form of nonviolent 
evasion using a weapon. The fact that x^ eapons are used leads to the 
suspicion that some of these victims may have played a part in causing 
the Incident. 
These findings on the active part of the rape victim to protect 
herself against an attack contrast with the nature of the 
cross-examination which she faces in court. In court, the issue of 
consent is often probed through detailed examination of evidence of 
physical dissent by the victim. The above findings suggest that 
physical assault victims appear to be somewhat responsible for the 
incidence. Again, this can be compared to rape literature which holds 
the rape victim responsible for the rape. 
Rioux (1975) lists the factors that are used to prove consent: 
testimony of the victim, testimony of others, other evidence that 
consent was extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm (struggling, 
torn clothing, screams, bruises, emotional state), character of the 
victim and previous sexual conduct. 
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According to Snelling (1975), one of the essentials of rape is 
non-consent to the act of penetration. Snelling (1975) states that at 
the critical moment a woman may have decided not to object or she may 
have consented to everything else but actual penetration. Thus, it may 
indeed be difficult for the woman to give a truthful and reliable 
answer especially if she feels subsequent regret. 
"Logically, there appears to be four possible 
situations: 
1. The woman mentally assents and therefore by 
her conduct manifests assent. 
2. The woman mentally assents though at the 
critical moment continuing to manifest dissent. 
3. The woman mentally dissents but by her conduct 
does not manifest dissent. 
4. The woman mentally dissents and manifests 
dissent."(Snelling, 1975, p.158). 
Snelling (1975) explains that there are no problems with situations one 
and four, though situation two would probably not be rape since the 
woman assents. It is situation three which is questionable. Legally, in 
order to prove rape it must be shown that the woman mentally (except in 
special cases of terror) dissented and also outwardly manifested 
dissent. The issue of manifestation of non-consent should not be 
regarded as a mere proof of the state of mind but as a necessary 
element in its own right. Snelling (1975) questions why the fundamental 
legal element of rape is merely the woman's secret or undisclosed 
mental attitude of dissent at the time of penetration and why this 
should be the precise issue for the jury. 
Snelling (1975) recommends that "consent" should be replaced by 
"acquiescence" or "allow" with a more objective significance and would 
thus direct more attention to conduct as distinct from state of mind. 
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Non-acquiescence can be inferred from resistance, struggles, words or 
any other form of manifestaton of objection at or immediately prior to 
the critical time of penetration. In cases where the woman ceases 
physical resistance due to exhaustion or apparent hopelessness, any 
kind of overt dissent or non-cooperation could infer non-acquiesence to 
penetration. Snelling (1975) concludes that hopefully a jury would 
decide the state of mind essentially on the evidence of outward 
behavior. Otherwise there is real risk of injustice. 
Bill C-127 has eliminated the need for cross-examination on 
corroboration and sexual history of the victim. However, consent still 
remains an Integral part of the cross-examination. Noting the above 
discussion on the problems of defining consent and the problems of 
proving lack of consent, brings to mind the Advisory Council on the 
Status of Women's (1976) statement that lack of consent is legally 
unprovable. Therefore, if it can still be alleged that the victim 
consented, then the vicious cycle of blaming the rape victim cannot be 
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will be seen later in the discussion. 
Bill C-127 can be perceived only as an improvement on and not as a 
solution for the old rape laws, since only technical changes in the law 
have been made. For example, the issue of consent is retained, and it 
is still possible to probe the issue of the victim's sexual history. 
This research will examine in detail the trial procedure faced by 
the sexual assault victim as compared to the physical assault victim. 
Emphasis will be placed on the extent to which sexual assault victims 
are still probed on issues of consent, corroboration and sexual 
history. Detailed comparisons of sexual assault and physical assault 
victims will be made to determine the purpose of the cross-examination, 
that is, whether it is still used to discredit the sexual assault 
victim and blame the rape victim for the rape. 
4. Jury Selection and Attitudes 
The foregoing discussion emphasizes that the process of 
socialization which is directed by myths on rape results in social and 
legal victimization of the rape victim. It must be recalled that 
members of a jury are individuals selected from the general public and 
that they too are influenced by socialization. 
"Every man, woman, and child has a jury of his 
fellow townspeople constantly judging him; and 
the verdicts these people render in our favor or 
against us frequently determine our success or 
failure, despair or happiness. If you are unlucky 
enough to be at the wrong place at the wrong 
time, you may suddenly find yourself in a 
courtroom where the verdict of a courtroom jury 
will mean life or death! Innocence is no 
guarantee of acquittal, far from it. A guilty man 
is easier to defend. At least he knows what 
happened. Whether you live or die depends, not on 
whether you did it or not, but on the verdict 
which comes down from the jury. You don't get a 
winning jury by loudly proclaiming your 
innocence"(Bryan, 1971, preface). 
Bryan (1971) adds to this dramatic theory that there is much calculated 
analysis on the part of the lawyer, which goes into selecting a winning 
jury. 
McCart (1964) also claims that every lawyer naturally wants to 
weed out potential jurors who would be unfavorable to his case. The 
goal of the law to obtain qualified and unbiased jurors supports the 
aim of lawyers to secure a favorable jury. Juries are selected with 
consideration to potential benefit or harm to the lawyer's case. This 
is accomplished by striking members of the panel on the basis of age, 
mentality, sex, race, nationality, economic status, education and 
occupation. 
McCart (1964) mentions the different and often contradictory 
theories for jury selection employed by some lawyers. There is a 
general impression among lawyers that male jurors, out of gallantry, 
favor women litigants and so, when representing a woman, they seek, an 
all-male jury. There is also an impression that a jury will favor a 
litigant of his or her race or creed. It is concluded that with the 
right to strike four members from the panel, it is generally possible 
to strike all members of a particular sex or race. 
According to Cornish (1958), lawyers challenge to get an all-male 
jury in sexual cases because they believe that women may be specially 
prejudiceu against a uexenuent in a soruid case. Another reason j.or 
this challenging is to shield women from the unpleasant facts of 
certain cases and from the embarrassment of having to discuss the 
evidence with members of the opposite sex in the jury room. 
According to Van Dyke (1977), women and blue-collar workers have 
been under-represented on juries. Much more liberal granting of excuses 
was given to mothers than to fathers, and the only women on juries 
until 1975 were those who volunteered. Van Dyke (1977) explains that 
this discrimination is slowly diminishing as principles of political 
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equality gain acceptance, but courts still continue to use selection 
procedures which result in under-representing women. 
In their research conducted in Great Britain, Baldwin and 
McConville (1979), found that 72.5% of their jurors were males. They 
also reason that the under-representation of women was the combined 
result of more men being summoned for jury duty, and more women 
applying for and being granted excuses on grounds of family 
committement. 
Van Dyke (1977) maintains that women, like other groups, tend to 
favor their own. He notes that in studies of pre-verdict juror 
behavior, women were found to be more lenient toward the accused. 
However, it is noted that the differences in verdicts given by men and 
women were in most cases statistically insignificant. 
Hastie, Penrod and Pennington (1983), on the other hand, 
generalize from research on gender differences that female students are 
more likely than male students to regard the defendant in a rape case 
as guilry. Baldwin and McConville (1979) also generalize from research 
findings that women tend to be more sympathetic to the defence than men 
unless it is a sexual assault case. However, in their research, no 
significant variations in verdicts returned were found for female 
jurors. 
"...Of the 176 trials examined, 18 involved 
all-male juries, the acquittal rate of these 13 
juries was slightly lower than the average for 
all juries. On the one hand, six or more women 
(and in one case ten) sat on 35 juries and it is 
interesting to note that their acquittal rate was 
even lower than that of the 18 all-male juries. 
If one examines the outcomes of those cases in 
which there were at least four women sitting on 
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the jury, the acquittal rate corresponds pretty 
well exactly to the city average"(Baldwin and 
McConville, 1979, p.100). 
Baldwin and McConville (1979) conclude that the presence of women in 
any number is not likely to change the nature of the verdict returned. 
Woods (1975) states that male jurors are especially likely to be 
unsympathetic to the prosecution in situations where there is evidence 
of prior acquaintance. This may be due to their identification with the 
male offender. Although male prosecutors usually seek out women jurors, 
they may end up with mostly men, often because women ask to be excused 
because they feel they cannot be objective. Wood (1975) concludes that 
jurors of both sexes may allow the victim's reputation to influence 
them. For example, prostitutes stand little chance of obtaining a 
conviction for rape, even though they are often victims of gang rape. 
In a simulated jury study on just world hypothesis by Jones and 
Aronson (1973), a defendant was depicted as having raped or attempted 
to rape either a virgin, a married woman or a divorcee. R.esults 
indicated that more severe sentences were given to defendants who raped 
a virgin rather than to those who raped a married woman or a divorcee. 
Interestingly, virgins were seen as more responsible for the rape than 
were the other women. Jones and Aronson (1973) conclude that the 
knowledge that innocent, highly respectable females could be raped was 
more threatening to the subject's belief in a just world than was the 
knowledge that married or divorced women could be raped. Thus, subjects 
convinced themselves that the virgin was not innocent and that she must 
have contributed to her fate in some way. 
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The above findings indicate that the need to explain the other's 
suffering may increase as the other's attractiveness increases. It also 
shows that the need to restore justice increases when events have more 
impact and when all possible explanations cannot be used effectively. 
That is, because subjects could not find fault with the virgin's 
character, they resorted to finding fault with her behavior (Jones and 
Aronson, 1973). 
In a similar study by Smith, Keating, Hester and Mitchell (1976), 
the factor of acquaintance with the assailant was varied. Findings 
indicated that when the victim was unacquainted with her assailant, 
greater responsibility was assigned to her than when she was acquainted 
with him. It was concluded that the greater perceived randomness of the 
assault in the unacquainted condition increased the need of the 
subjects to make sense of the event. This was particularly evident when 
the victim was a more respectable nun or social worker. 
Hartwig and Sandler (1977) argue that blaming the victim in a rape 
trial may serve, on a unconscious level, as a self-protective mechanism 
for both male and female jurors. It may help the female juror to deal 
with her own repressed fear of rape by believing that "it can't happen 
to me unless I bring it on myself". For the male juror, there may be 
unconscious identification with the defendant on some level. By blaming 
the victim, he is protected from having to confront the implications of 
aggresive sex-role behavior he may have participated in on some level 
at some point in his life or in his fantasies. Thus, on juries for 
sexual assault cases, guilt and perceived personal threat may come into 
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play, resulting in the juror's denial of injustice and blaming the 
victim. This serves to confirm the juror's belief in a just world. 
Hartwig and Sandler (1977) also note that another reason for the 
reluctance of jurors to convict in rape cases may be due to the harsh 
penalties. They argue that reluctance may lie in the accepted view that 
rape is "not all that serious". It is important to note that Bill C-127 
has lowered the penalties for sexual assault on the assumption that 
harsh penalties are one reason for low conviction rates. In detail, 
simple assault carries a maximum penalty of five years for physical 
assault and 10 years for sexual assault. Assault causing bodily harm 
carried a maximum penalty of 10 years for physical assault and 14 for 
sexual assault. Aggravated assault carries a maximum penalty of 14 
years for physical assault and up to life imprisonment for sexual 
assault. 
It can be generalized from the above discussion that women have 
been under-represented on juries and conflicting theories have been 
Postulated ^^^ *~h"*s. There are also conflicting findings on. the 
attitudes of juries when women jurors are present, and the resulting 
verdict given in sexual assault trials. However, it must be noted that 
these findings are based on simulated jury cases. There is a 
wide-spread perception that women jurors are more sympathetic to the 
rape victim than men. Furthermore, defence lawyers still make a 
concerted effort to exclude women from sexual assault juries. Since the 
literature on jury selection and jury attitude is non-conclusive, a 
secondary objective of this research is to examine in detail how juries 
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are selected and how they vote. 
Evaluation of Bill C-127 as an Instrument for Social and Legal Reform 
As has been noted in the introduction, the recent establishment of Bill 
C-127 has not allowed time for empirical research. Most of the 
following discussion derives from leading magazines. Women's magazines 
appear to be at the forefront for this analysis and criticism. 
Cohen and Backhouse (1930) disagree with the proposals for Bill 
C-127. They question whether the proposed changes will actually 
encourage more women to report rape, whether they will act as a 
deterrent and whether more rapists will be convicted. They emphasize 
that the central question is whether rape can, in fact, be desexed? In 
this analysis, rape victims perceive rape to be totally different from 
other forms of physical assault. Cohen and Backhouse (1980) compare it 
to the male fear of castration. 
Cohen and Backhouse (1980) maintain that eliminating "rape" from 
criminal law will not eliminate rape itself, and lowering the penalties 
will depreciate the seriousness of the offence. They argue that by 
changing rape to assault and restructuring the offence, an enormous 
area would be created for defence counsels to explore and this will not 
improve the situation for the victim. In contrast, Kotash (1981) 
concludes that getting rid of the word "rape" may dispel much of the 
cruel mythology attached to it, and impress the public with its 
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seriousness. 
Brownmiller (1975) argues that desexing rape is highly 
controversial and questions whether it can be done. According to 
Brownmiller, rape degrades the person's sexual being and is not like 
any other assault. Specifically, rape damages the psyche through 
invasion of the person's private parts. 
Cooper and Weinberg (1978) predict that the proposed changes will 
go a long way toward bringing rape and related offences into the 
mainstream of our criminal justice system. However, they are concerned 
about the proposed use of psychiatrists in cases of aggravated indecent 
assault. 
"...The potential for abuse of victims by 
psychiatrists, who are already notorious for 
"blaming" the victim, is frightening. The authors 
foresee, in addition to further victimization of 
the victim as defense and crown psychiatrists 
take their place in this game, a new form of 
traumatic neurosis. The use of psychiatrists in 
such cases will work against the victim's 
recovery from the original assault. If she 
recovers, the assault "could not have been so 
bad", so why should the assailant be 
punished"(Cooper and Weinberg, 1978, p.174). 
They conclude that a system will develop which further traumatizes the 
rape victim and encourages her disability. 
According to Kotash (1981), many women's groups and lawyers still 
feel the bill is badly drafted. The assertion is made that the new 
provisions may result in shorter sentences than ever and that 
everything from unwanted touching to "normal" rape would be prosecuted 
as sexual assault, while the conviction for aggravated sexual assault 
would be reserved for the most violent attacks. 
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According to Cohen and Backhouse (1980), one of the major failings 
of Bill C-127 concerns the issue of consent. Just as with rape, for the 
Crown to prove that a sexual assault took place it would have to 
convince the court that the woman did not consent. The 
cross-examination would still result in humiliating the victim. They 
maintain that the changes are cosmetic on the issue of consent since 
they do not alter the law substantially. 
According to Lewis (1979), Bill C-127 may not be adequate enough 
to overcome the difficulties faced by the rape victim. It is not clear 
that the issue of consent can be resolved effectively by replacing the 
offence of rape with some form of assault. The proposed emphasis on 
violence cannot be expected to alleviate the difficulties arising from 
the existing law, that the changes must be substantive rather than 
merely semantic. 
Lewis (1979) argues that the proposed amendments to the code could 
constitute a major change in the law by reducing the role of consent 
substantially. 
"It is not, however, made explicit in the 
statements of what the Bill is expected to 
accomplish that assault is the direct or indirect 
use of force without consent. To obtain a 
conviction for either indecent assault or 
aggravated indecent assault, the prosecution 
would have to be able to establish as a fact that 
the complainant did not consent, or that consent 
was obtained by fraud."(Lewis, 1979, p.449). 
According to Lewis (1979), in instances of severe physical damage to 
the victim this would not be difficult to prove but it is in the 
absence of signs of force that the present law permits the defence to 
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cross-examine the woman. It is argued that because lack of consent is 
essential in proving that the accused is guilty, it is difficult to 
show the proposed amendments can be expected to alter in substance the 
nature of the trial process, whether the charge be rape or some form of 
assault. 
Lewis (1979) points out that the essential element of rape is 
intercourse without consent, while the essential element of assault is 
violence or force without consent. The changing of "rape" to "assault" 
avoids neither the issue of consent nor the resulting problems. 
Brooks (1975) maintains that the laws concerning proof of rape and 
the way they function both influences, and are influenced by existing 
social values. And so long as the laws remain this way, they will 
enforce the continuance of the sex roles this attitude assumes. Clark 
and Lewis (1977) argue that the system of inequality which has 
determined the formulation and application of rape laws is the root 
cause of rape itself and that in order to eliminate rape, the 
underlying social structure which produces it must be altered. 
It can be concluded that Bill C-127 has been received with mixed 
receptions. The leading negative criticism appears to be that the 
victim can still, one way or another, be cross-examined as to her 
sexual history and on corroboration. The other major criticism focuses 
on whether rape can actually be desexed and compared to other assaults. 
It also appears that much negative criticism is given to the retaining 
of the issue of consent. This, as noted in the literature review, is 
one strong argument used by the social and legal processes of justice 
44 
to blame the victim for the rape. Again, if the Advisory Council on the 
Status of Women's (1976) statement that the lack of consent is legally 
unprovable is correct, then it can be concluded that the vicious cycle 
of blaming the rape victim for the rape cannot be broken. 
Foremost recognition should be given to the fact that social 
change in attitudes occurs very slowly and that it is possible that for 
the near future rape victims will continue to face double 
victimization. This will exist as long as the social and legal 
processes of justice continue to be based on myths and misconceptions 
about rape. 
Purpose of Research 
The purpose of this research will be to evaluate Bill C-127 by 
using three procedures. First, the comparability of rape to physical 
assault will be assessed through the observation of sexual assault and 
physical assault trials on the issues of corroboration, consent and 
sexual history of the victim. Secondly, jury selection for sexual 
assault and physical assault trials will be compared. Thirdly, sexual 
assault cases will be compared to physical assault cases using the data 
from Statistics Canada Law and Enforcement Figures. Specifically, a 
comparison of the statistics on the number reported, founded and 
charged pre and post Bill C-127 will be made. 
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Hypotheses 
A. Comparison of Sexual and Physical Assault 
The treatment of sexual and physical assault cases by the 
criminal justice system can be compared in three explicit ways: (1) Are 
comparable levels of severity of the physical and sexual assault 
charged at the same level of severity of charge? (2) Are the court 
processes to which the victim is subjected comparable in both types of 
assault? And (3) Are the verdicts by the court, and the sentences given 
by the judge, comparable for physical and sexual assault? 
1. Similarity of Charge. Even though the facts of various cases 
are very different, judgements can be made of the relative severity of 
force used by the accused. A method of scaling the level of force 
allows a comparison between the relative level of force actually used 
by the accused and the level of force attributed to the assault as 
reflected in the actual charge. 
HYPOTHESIS Al: If the past unequal treatment of rape victims continues, 
then for equal severity of the actual case, those accused of a sexual 
assault will be charged at a lower level than those accused of a 
physical assault. 
2. Similarity of Process. For both physical and sexual assault 
cases the victim is the chief witness. The testimony given by the 
victim will be challenged by the defense. An observer in the court room 
can count the number and types of questions that are put to the victim 
by the defense, and the manner in which they are asked. 
HYPOTHESIS A2: If the past unequal treatment of rape victims continues 
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then the victim of a sexual assault, charge severity held equal, will 
be subjected to questioning which attack their character and 
credibility more than the victims of physical assault. 
3. Similarity of Outcome. Trials first result in a verdict of 
guilty or not guilty. Then, if guilty, in a sentence. In most trials, 
the verdict is seldom in question. Historically, the exception has been 
rape trials which are convicted at less than half the normal rate. At 
sentencing, the penalties given have been far below the maximum 
available. 
HYPOTHESIS A3: If the past unequal treatment of rape victims continues, 
then cases of sexual assault will be found guilty less often and given 
lighter sentences than cases of physical assault when severity of the 
case is equal. 
Figure 1 
Summary Of Design Comparing Physical and Sexual Assault. 
:Type and Level 
:of Assault 
:Physical Assault 
: Simple 
: Bodily Harm 
: Aggravated 
:Sexual Assault 
: Simple 
: Bodily Harm 
: Aggravated 
Similarity 
Issue 
Process 
. Issue 
Outcome : 
Issue : 
47 
B. Composition and Selection of Juries 
The preponderance of all male juries in rape trials can arise from 
two sources: first is the greater number of men than women who are 
called for possible jury duty, and second on actions taken by the 
defense lawyer to exclude women from being selected to the jury. The 
jury panels are drawn from the city assessment rolls, thus including 
only property owners. To the extent that property is owned and 
controlled by men, either in fact, or because legal precedent places 
the husband's but not wife's name on the assessment roll, there will be 
bias in the frequency with which women are even called for jury duty. 
HYPOTHESIS Bl: Women are under-represented on assessment rolls and are 
not available for jury duty to the same extent as men. 
HYPOTHESIS B2: At the time of jury selection, women are more likely 
than men"to be excluded from a jury for a sexual assault trial, and 
more likely to be excluded from a jury for sexual assault than for 
physical assault. 
HYPOTHESIS B3: If the defense assumption is well founded, the absence 
of women on a jury for a sexual assault trial will be more likely to 
result in an acquittal than when women are represented on the jury. 
C. Statistical Comparison Before and After Changes to the Criminal Code 
On the surface, the most reasonable approach to evaluate the 
effects of the new sexual assault law would be to compare the 
percentage of similar cases reported, founded, cleared, and charged 
before and after the new law. However, such a direct comparison cannot 
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be made for two reasons: first, the old law separated "rape" (requiring 
penetration) from "indecent" assault; the two sub-categories were 
combined into a general total of "Sexual Offenses". Second, the data 
were reported separately for men and women. The new law has three 
levels which reflect the severity of the assault, not the type or 
nature of the assault (i.e., no longer making the distinction between 
rape and indecent acts), and data are no longer reported separately for 
men and women. Thus, both the definition and the categories have been 
changed and so direct comparison is not possible. 
To find an indirect means of comparison, Renner and Sahjpaul 
(1985) used the Statistics Canada Law and Enforcement Figures 
(1973-1982) and compiled ten year statistics for nine major offence 
categories. The remarkable feature of these data is the steady increase 
in the number of cases for all categories, and the remarkable stability 
of the percentage of the absolute number of cases which are founded, 
cleared, and charged each year. The Standard Deviation is less than one 
percent v,See Appendix Ey. This ten year base period will allow a 
comparison of new (i.e., post 1983) statistics with the past reference 
points. The continued stability of the, other data will argue against 
any changes being due to the passage of time. 
HYPOTHESIS CI: All criminal code offences, excluding sexual assault, 
will continue the steady pattern set by the ten year trend data. 
HYPOTHESIS C2: If the change in criminal code to sexual assault had the 
desired effect, there will be a larger change in sexual offenses in 
general from the ten year trend data, than for other offenses. 
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Method 
A. Comparison of Sexual and Physical Assault 
fiqfflPlfl 
Data on five sexual assault and 22 physical assault cases were 
collected at the law courts of Halifax and Metropolitan Toronto and 
jury selection information was also collected from the above courts. 
Data Collection Procedure 
A review of the literature on sexual and physical assault revealed 
no factual data on actual trial proceedings. However, much of what did 
exist focused on purely descriptive information. Thus, the Court 
Observation Questionnaire was created and standardized (See Appendix 
A). 
Since the study involved observing actual trial proceedings, the 
questionnaire had to be designed such that no information would be 
missed. Thus, the Court Observation Questionnaire involved checking the 
number of times a question was asked from a particular category of 
events and assigning a value to it. Values would denote whether each 
question was used to credit or discredit a victim or whether the 
question was used for purely informational detail. 
Data were collected by the author and seven students in Community 
Psychology at Dalhousie University. The author trained the students and 
supervised actual data collection. The Court Observation Questionnaire 
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was standardized by the author during practice data collections. 
Inter-observer reliability was checked for tone, stage and type 
of question asked by lawyers in two cases. Four observers were present 
simultaneously and a total of 705 questions were rated. All four 
observers agreed on type of tone 69% of the time, on type of stage 72% 
of the time and on type of question 70% of the time. Three of four 
observers agreed on type of tone 24% of the time, on type of stage 17% 
of the time and on type of question 22% of the time. Two of four 
observers agreed on type of tone 7% of the time, on type of stage 11% 
of the time and on type of question 8% of the time. The data collected 
were considered reliable as the majority of questions were similarly 
rated, as shown in Table 1. 
Measure 
The Court Observation Questionnaire compared treatment of victim 
during the trial, that is, similarity of charge and similarity of 
process and outcome of trail. Major areas of concern were the types of 
questions asked by the defence and prosecutor. 
Evaluation Design 
1. Similarity of Charge. Bill C-127 defines three levels of sexual 
assault, as equated with the three levels of physical assault, giving 
consequent sentences. Using this as a guide, a 14-point scale was 
devised, incorporating these three levels of assault. On this scale, 
simple assault would encompass levels one to five; assault causing 
Table 1 
Inter-observer Reliability Ratings 
Agreement 
All Four 
Observers 
Three of 
Tone of 
Question 
69% 
(487) 
24% 
Four Observers (169) 
Two of 7% 
Four Observers (49) 
Total 705 
Stage of 
Question 
72% 
(508) 
17% 
(120) 
11% 
(77) 
705 
Type of 
Question 
70% 
(494) 
22% 
(155) 
8% 
(56) 
705 
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bodily harm would encompass levels six to ten and aggravated assault 
would encompass levels 11 to 14. (See Appendix B). This scale was used 
to rate the severity of the offence in terms of the criteria set by 
Bill C-127, and compared to the level of severity attributed to the 
assault, as reflected in the actual charge. A comparison of sexual and 
physical assault charges was then made. 
2. Similarity of Process. Each sexual assault trial was compared 
to each of the physical assault trials on four variables. The four 
primary variables of interest were the number of questions on 
corroboration, sexual history, consent and credibility asked of the 
victim and the rating assigned to each question. (See Appendix F). 
3. Similarity of Outcome. Each sexual assault case was compared to 
each physical assault case on one variable, that is, the sentence given 
to the accused. 
B. Composition and Selection of Juries 
Sample 
Data were collected on 122 potential jurors selected for two 
sexual and two physical assault trials in Halifax. 
Measure 
The Jury Selection Questionnaire was created and standardized by 
Dr. Edward Renner, 1934. The main focus of the Jury Selection 
Questionnaire was on noting the number of males and females, 
approximate age, race, dress, and outcome, that is, whether the 
individual was accepted, rejected or put on stand-by (See Appendix C). 
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C. Statistical Comparison Before and After Changes to the Criminal Code 
Data Collection Procedure 
Statistics Canada Crime and Enforcement Figures from 1973 to 1983 
were examined to explore the trends in sexual assault as compared to 
physical assault and other crimes. Specifically, the number reported, 
number founded, number cleared and number charged were examined for the 
following crimes; sexual assault, physical assault, homicide, robbery, 
theft over $200 and breaking and entering (See Appendix E for category 
definition of Statistics Canada Crime and Enforcement Figures). 
Evaluation Design 
Pre and post comparisons of of the above crimes were made in terms 
of figures from 1973 to 1982 compared to figures after the impact of 
Bill C-127, that is, post 1983. 
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Results 
Description of finnwlfi Gafi^ fi 
Data on 27 cases were collected of which 23 were in Metropolitan 
Toronto and four in Halifax. Of those in Toronto, five were at the 
supreme court level and 18 at the provincial court level; all four in 
Halifax were at the supreme court level. 
Of the 27 cases, five were sexual assault and 22 were physical 
assault. The accused in the five sexual assault cases were charged with 
simple sexual assault, whereas, 15 accused of physical assault were 
charged with simple physical assault, three with assault causing bodily 
harm and four with aggravated physical assault. These results are 
summarized in Table 2. 
For each of the five sexual assault cases there was one female 
victim. In comparison, 16 physical assault victims were male and six 
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whereas, in two cases there were two victims. 
For each of the five sexual assault cases, there was one male 
accused. For 20 physical assault cases there was one accused in each, 
in one case there were two accused, and in another there were six 
accused. There were 26 males and two females accused in the physical 
assault cases. 
S i m i l a r i t y of Charge 
Each case of assault was scored for the actual level of force used 
Table 2 
Location and Court Level of Observed Cases 
Court Halifax Metro. Toronto 
Level Provincial Supreme Provincial Supreme Total 
Simple Sexual 0 2 2 1 5 
Assault 
Simple Physical 0 0 15 0 15 
Assault 
Physical Assault 0 1 0 2 3 
Causing Bodily Harm 
Aggravated 0 1 1 2 4 
Physical Assault 
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by the accused (See Appendix B) and compared to the level, that is, 
severity of charge faced by the accused. There was a significant 
under-charging of accused in all cases of assault,/C(2)=17.33, p<.002. 
These results are summarized in Table 3. 
All five sexual assault accused were charged with simple sexual 
assault. However, considering the actual level of force used by the 
accused, two should have been charged with sexual assault causing 
bodily harm; in the 15 simple physical assault cases, 13 should have 
been charged with physical assault causing bodily harm and two should 
have been charged with aggravated physical assault. In only three cases 
of simple sexual assault, three cases of physical assault causing 
bodily harm and four cases of aggravated physical assault, did the 
charge accurately reflect the actual level of force used. 
similarity of Process, 
Unit of Analysis. For the hypothesis based on the process, that 
is, how lawyers differ in the type of tone, stage or question asked, 
two possible approaches for analyzing the data were considered; (1) 
using the cases and (2) using the question asked by lawyers as the 
primary unit of analysis. 
In twelve physical assault cases the accused represented himself 
and, therefore, there was no defence lawyer. Thus, these cases were not 
strictly comparable to the five sexual assault cases. Excluding these 
reduced the sample to 10 physical assault cases and five sexual assault 
cases available for evaluating the court process. These cases differed 
widely in the total number of questions asked by lawyers (from 30 to 
500). Thus, because the sample of cases from all possible cases was 
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Table 3 
Comparison of Level of Force and Level of Charge 
Simple Assault Causing Aggravated 
Assault Bodily Harm Assault 
Sexual Assault: 
Expected 3 
Observed 5 
Physical Assault: 
Expected 0 
Observed 15 
%?4>-=17, .33 
2 
0 
16 
3 
, p<.002 
0 
0 
6 
4 
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small and the standard deviation of the number of questions asked was 
large, generalization to cases in general would be too limited. 
An alternative to the use of mean number of questions was to 
calculate for each of the categories the percentage of the total number 
of questions. One may argue that this is a form of standardization 
which eliminates the variance due to differences in the total number of 
questions asked, thus giving each case equal weight. Since cases 
differed so widely in the total number of questions asked by lawyers, 
the use of percentages was rejected because the reliability of 
percentages would have been questionable and the standardizaton a 
possible distortion of the information. 
However, selecting the question as the primary unit of analysis 
allowed the assumption that the sample of 3531 questions asked of 
victims were from the population of questions that are put to victims. 
This assumption provided the best comparison between sexual and 
physical assault cases for evaluating the strategies used by lawyers in 
the two types of cases. In addition, differences in mean scores for 
each category of question, i.e., the tone, stage and type of question 
will be reported and used as a secondary analysis. 
Organization of Analysis. For the hypothesis based on the court 
process, the dependent variables were tone, stage and type of question 
asked by the prosecutor and the defence. In order to determine whether 
there was a difference between the two types of assault cases, lawyers 
were compared on these dependent variables. 
Lawyer Differences in Tone of Question 
Sexual Assault Cases. Lawyers differed significantly in the 
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frequencies with which different tones were used in sexual assaul 
cases,%?2)=175.75, p<.001, as shown in Table 4a. The prosecutor asked 
only neutral tone questions (98.8%), whereas, the defence used a 
neutral tone 79.9% of the time. 
Physical Assault Cases. Lawyers differed significantly in the 
frequencies with which different tones were used in physical assault 
cases,X(2)=136.83, p<.001, as shown in Table 4b. The prosecutor asked 
only neutral tone questions (99.5%), whereas, the defence used a 
negative tone 16.5% of the time. 
Comparison of Sexual and Physical Assault Cases. A comparison of 
Tables 4a and 4b shows small differences in the proportion of the 
various tones of questions between sexual and physical assault cases 
which were asked by the prosecutor and the defence. The prosecutor used 
a slightly smaller proportion of neutral questions in sexual assault 
cases, with the emphasis shifted to some positive questions, /tT2)=6.61, 
p<.04, as shown in Table 5a. Of particular interest was that only a 
total of eight (1%) positive questions were asked by the prosecutor out 
of a total of 1,568. In comparison, the defence did not use positive 
tone questions and placed more emphasis on negative tone questions in 
sexual assault cases (20.1%) than in physical assault cases (16.5%), at 
the expense of neutral tone questions with differences marginally 
significant when the proportion of neutral and negative tone questions 
were compared,%Tl)=4.07, p<.04, as shown in Table 5b. 
^prnmiary Analysis. It should be noted that the effect of tone was 
statistically significant as long as the sample of individual questions 
were the primary unit of analysis using chi square test for statistical 
significance. However, if the cases were taken as the unit of analysis 
Table 4a 
Lawyer Differences in Tone of Question in Sexual 
Assault 
Prosecutor 
(n) 
Defence 
(n) 
Total 
(n) 
Neutral 
• 98.8% 
(764) 
79.7% 
(676) 
1440 
Negative 
.1% 
(1) 
20.0% 
(170) 
171 
Positive 
1.0% 
(8) 
.1% 
(1) 
9 
Total 
100% 
773 
100% 
848 
1621 
X^) = 175.75, p<.001 
Table 4b 
Lawyer Differences in Tone of Question in Physical 
Assault 
Prosecuto 
(n) 
Defence 
(n) 
Total 
(n) 
Neutral 
r 99.5% 
(791) 
83.3% 
(929) 
1720 
Negative 
.4% 
(3) 
16.5% 
(184) 
187 
Positive 
.1% 
(1) 
.2% 
(2) 
3 
Total 
100% 
795 
100% 
1115 
1910 
% (2)=136.83, p<.001 
Table 5a 
Prosecutor Differences in Tone of Question 
Neutral 
Sexual Assault 98.8% 
(n) (764) 
Physical Assault 99.5% 
(n) (791) 
Negative 
.1% 
(1) 
.4% 
(3) 
Positive 
1.0% 
(3) 
.1% 
(1) 
Total 
100% 
773 
100% 
795 
1(2)=6.61, p<.04 
Table 5b 
Defence Differences in Tone of Question 
Neutral Negative Total 
Sexual Assault 79.9% 20.1% 100% 
(n) (677) (170) 847 
Physical Assault 33.5% 16.5% 100% 
/ _ \ / r\*>r\\ / i o / \ i i i i 
X )^= 4 . 0 7 , p<.04 
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then, for tone, these effects are obscured by the wide variation in the 
total number of questions that were asked from case to case. For 
example, although the defence asked a larger number of questions than 
the prosecutor (1963 versus 1568), this difference was not 
statistically significant either overall or individually for sexual or 
physical assault cases, as shown in Table 10 (See page &7)• The 
defence did, however, ask significantly more negative tone questions 
than did the prosecutor, t(14)=-3.30, p<.005, as shown in Table 10. 
While the results based on questions rather than cases as the unit 
of analysis were consistent, the cases are a less sensitive measure of 
the court process. For example, although the defence asked a 
significantly greater proportion of negative tone questions in sexual 
assault than in physical assault cases, the difference between the mean 
number of negative questions asked in sexual (X=33) and in physical 
assault $=10) cases by the defence, although different by nearly a 
factor of two, was not statistically significant, £(1,13)=.97, p<.34, 
as shown in Table 10. 
Lawyer Differences in Stage of Questions 
Sexual Assault Cases, Lawyers differed significantly in the 
frequencies with which questions about different stages of the 
incidence were used in sexual assault cases, ]X(^)=21«79, p<".001, as 
shown in Table 6a. The prosecutor asked proportionally more meeting 
accused, after incidence and present time questions of sexual assault 
victims than did the defence. However, the defence asked proportionally 
more prior to incidence and incidence scene questions of sexual assault 
victims than did the prosecutor. 
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Physical Assault Cases. Lawyers differed significantly in the 
frequencies with which questions about different stages of the 
incidence v/ere used in physical assault cases, X(A)=4l .54, p<.001, as 
shown in Table 6b. The prosecutor asked proportionally more prior to 
incidence, incidence scene and present time questions of physical 
assault victims than did the defence. However, the defence asked 
proportionally more meeting accused and after incidence questions of 
physical assault victims than did the prosecutor. 
Comparison of Sexual and Physical Assault Cases. A comparison of 
Tables 6a and 6b show that except for present time, there appeared to 
be a reversal in question-asking strategy with regards to stage by 
lawyers depending on the type of case. Tables 7a and 7b show that both 
the prosecutor and the defence significantly alter the proportion of 
questions asked in sexual and physical assault cases with/U(4)=32.29, 
p<.001 and^T4)=29.83, jp<.001 respectively. 
Secondary Analysis. The effect of stage was statistically 
significant as long as the sample of individual questions were used as 
the primary unit of analysis. However, if the cases were taken as the 
unit of analysis, then effects for stage were obscured by the large 
case to case variation, as shown in Table 10. For example, although the 
defence asked a significantly greater proportion of meeting accused 
questions of physical assault than of sexual assault victims, the mean 
difference in the number of meeting accused questions asked in physical 
assault (X=13.7) and sexual assault (X=9.2) cases by the defence was 
not statistically significant, F(l,13)=.25, p<.53, as shown in Table 
10. 
Table 6a 
Lawyer Differences in Stage of Question in Sexual 
Assault 
Prior to Meet- Incid- After Pres- Total 
meeting ing ence incid- ent 
accused accused scene ence time 
Prosecutor 16.9% 8.3% 25.0% 24.4% 26.4% 100% 
(n) (131) (64) (193) (181) (204) 773 
Defence 19.8% 5.8% 32.2% 22.4% 19.7% 100% 
(n) 168) (49) (273) (190) (167) 848 
Total 229 113 466 371 371 1621 
(n) 
/C(4)=21.79, p<.001 
Table 6b 
Lawyer Differences in Stage of Question in Physica 
Assault 
Prior to Meet- Incid- After Pres- Total 
meeting ing ence incid- ent 
accused accused scene ence time 
Prosecutor 
(n) 
Defence 
(n) 
Total 
(n) 
22.5% 6.2% 
(179) (49) 
16.8% 12.8% 
(187) (143) 
366 192 
*v2 
X(4)=41.54, 
33.7% 
(268) 
28.2% 
(314) 
582 
p<.001 
17.1% 
(136) 
23.0% 
(257) 
393 
20.5% 
(163) 
19.2% 
(214) 
377 
100% 
795 
100% 
1115 
1910 
Table 7a 
Prosecutor Differences in Stage of Question 
Prior to Meet- Incid- After Pres- Total 
meeting ing ence incid- ent 
accused accused scene ence time 
Sexual 
Assault 
(n) 
Physical 
Assault 
(n) 
Total 
(n) 
16.9% 
(131) 
22.5% 
(179) 
310 
8.3% 
(64) 
6.2% 
(49) 
113 
25.0% 
(193) 
33.7% 
(268) 
461 
24.4% 
(181) 
17.1% 
(136) 
317 
26.4% 
(204) 
20.5% 
(153) 
357 
100% 
773 
100% 
795 
1568 
%(4)=32.29, p<.001 
Table 7b 
Defence Differences in Stage of Question 
Prior to Meet- Incid- After Pres- Total 
meeting ing ence incid- ent 
accused accused scene ence time 
Sexual 19.8% 5.8% 32.8% 22.4% 19.7% 100% 
Assault (168) (49) (274) (190) (167) 848 
(n) 
Physical 16.8% 12.8% 28.2% 23.0% 19.2% 100% 
Assault (187) (143) (314) (257) (214) 1115 
(n) 
Total 355 192 588 447 381 1963 
(n) 
,(4)=29.83, p<.001 
66 
Lawyer Differences in Type of Question 
Sexual Assault Cases. Lawyers differed significantly in the 
frequencies with which different types of questions were asked in 
sexual assault cases,%^4)=150.11, p<.001, as shown in Table 8a. The 
prosecutor asked proportionally more information questions of sexual 
assault victims (95.1%) than did the defence. The defence asked a 
greater proportion of credibility (20.0%) and consent (4.2%) questions 
of sexual assault victims than did the prosecutor. 
Physical Assault Cases.. Lawyers differed significantly in the 
frequencies with which different types of questons were asked in 
physical assault cases,/£A4)=154.54, p<.001, as shown in Table 3b. The 
prosecutor asked proportionally more information questions of physical 
assault victims (96.4%) than did the defence. The defence, in 
comparison, asked a greater proportion of credibility questions (19.8%) 
of physical assault victims than did the prosecutor. 
Comparison of Sexual and Physical Assault Cases. A comparison of 
Tables 3a and 8b show that the prosecutor asked proportionally the same 
number of information questions of sexual assault victims (95.1%) and 
of physical assault victims (96.4%),/£l3)=3.36, p<.34, as shown in 
Table 9a. The defence, in comparison, asked proportionally more 
non-information question and in particular more consent questions of 
sexual assault victims (4.2%) than of physical assault victims (0.3%), 
/£(4)=52.92, p<.001, as shown in Table 9b. 
Secondary Analysis. When cases were taken as the unit of analysis, 
the effects of type of question was statistically significant for 
credibility questions only. That is, the defence asked significantly 
more credibility questions than did the prosecutor of physical assault 
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Table Ra 
Lawyer Differences in Type of Question in Sexual 
Assault 
Infor- Cred-
mation ibility 
Prosecutor 95.1% 
(n) 
Defence 
(n) 
Total 
(n) 
(735) 
73.7% 
(625) 
1360 
2.6% 
(20) 
20.0% 
(170) 
190 
Past 
history 
0 
0 
.8% 
(7) 
7 
Corrob- Con-
oratii 
1.9% 
(15) 
1.2/o 
(10) 
25 
on sent 
.4% 
(3) 
4.2% 
(36) 
39 
Total 
100% 
773 
100% 
848 
1621 
^(4)=160.11, p<.001 
Table 8b 
Lawyer Differences in Type of Question in Physical 
Assault 
Infor- Cred- Past Corrob- Con- Total 
mation ibilltv historv oration sent 
Prosecutor 
(n) 
Defence 
(n) 
Total 
(n) 
96.4% 
(766) 
79.4% 
(885) 
1651 
X 
1.5% 
(12) 
19.8% 
(221) 
233 
2 
(4)=154, 
-
-
_ 
-
— 
.54, P< 
2.0% 
(16) 
.4% 
(5) 
21 
.001 
.10% 
(1) 
.3% 
(3) 
4 
100% 
795 
100% 
1115 
1910 
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Table 9a 
Prosecutor Differences in Type of Question 
Infor-
mation 
Sexual 95.1 
Assault 735) 
(n) 
Physical 96.4 
Assault (766) 
(n) 
Total 1501 
(n) 
Cred-
ibility 
2.6 
(20) 
1.5 
(12) 
32 
Past 
history 
— 
-
— 
-
— 
X(3)=3.36, 
Corrob-
oration 
1.9 
(15) 
2.0 
(16) 
31 
P<.34 
Con-
sent 
.4 
(3) 
.1 
(1) 
4 
Total 
100% 
773 
100% 
795 
1568 
Table 8b 
Defence Differences in Type of Question 
Infor- Cred- Past Corrob- Con- Total 
mation ibility history oration sent 
Sexual 73.7 
Assault (625) 
(n) 
Physical 79.4 
Assault (885) 
(n) 
Total 1510 
(n) 
20.0 
(170) 
19.8 
(221) 
391 
Xw= 
.8 
(7) 
-
7 
:52.92, 
1.2 
(10) 
.4 
(5) 
15 
p<.00l 
4.20 
(36) 
.3 
(3) 
39 
100% 
348 
100% 
1115 
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TABLE 10 
Table of Means 
Dependent: 
Measures : 
i 
Tone 
Neutral : 
Negative 
Positive • 
Stage 
Prior : 
Meeting 
Incidence: 
After 
Present 
Type 
Infro. 
Cred. 
Past 
Corrob. 
Consent 
Total 
Sexual Assault 
Pros. 
Mean 
154 
.88 
1.40 
25 
12 
40 
40 
38 
148 
4 
-
3 
1 
156 
Defence 
Mean 
136 
33 
.2 
33 
9 
55 
37 
34 
125 
33 
1.2 
2 
7 
169 
<N=5) 
Lawyer : 
Differences. 
t-value '• 
.33 : 
-2.31 
.82 
-.53 
.91 
-.45 
.26 
.20 
.41 
-2.19 
-
.56 
-1.30 
-.19 
Phys 
Pros. 
Mean 
79 
.10 
.30 
18 
5 
27 
14 
17 
77 
1 
-
' 2 
0 
' 79 
ical Assault (N=10) 
Defence 
Mean 
93 
18 
.20 
19 
14 
32 
25 
22 
88 
22 
-
.2 
.6 
111 
Lawyer : 
Differences • 
t-value 
-.63 ! 
-2.32* 
.32 
-.13 
-2.04 
-.62 
-.79 
-.83 
-.49 
-2.24* 
-
1.77 
-1.20 
-1.09 
Pros, vs: 
Defence . 
t-value 
-.14 : 
-3.30* 
.91 
-.51 
-1.44 
-.71 
-.61 
-.35 
-
-3.18* 
• 
: 1.67 
• -1.58 
: -.89 
Cases Overall 
Prosecutor : 
SA vs PA 
F-value 
1.36 : 
1.21 
1.55 
.55 
3.02 
.35 
2.66 
1.04 
1.27 
2.03 
-
: .68 
4.88 
i 1.40 
(N=15) 
Defence 
SA vs PA 
F-value 
.39 
.97 
-
.82 
: .25 
.77 
• .23 
.39 
.34 
: .46 
2.17 
: 2.21 
3.30 
: .51 
*(P<.05) 
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victims tO)=-2.24, p<.01 and of victims overall, t<(5)=-3.18, p<.01, 
as shown in Table 10. 
Although the defence asked a significantly greater proportion of 
information questions of physical assault victims and consent questions 
of sexual assault victims, the mean difference in the number of 
information and consent questions asked in physical assault cases 
0(=83, X=«5) and in sexual assault cases (X=125, X=7) by the defence 
was not statistically significant, j?(l,13)=.34, p<.57 and F(l,13)=3.30, 
p<.09, as shown in Table 10. 
Similarity of Charge 
The outcome of sexual and physical assault cases was compared by 
examining two sets of data: (1) the verdict and sentencing of the 
primary sample of cases and (2) the sentencing of the secondary sample 
of 202 physical assault and 13 sexual assault trials that took place in 
Metropolitan Toronto in November and December of 1984 and January, 
1985. 
Primary Sample. Of the five sexual assault cases, three accused 
were found not guilty, one accused was found guilty and one case was 
still in progress. Of the 22 physical assault cases, five were found 
not guilty, 15 accused were found guilty, one case was still in 
progress, and in one case involving six accused, three were found not 
guilty and three were charged with a lesser included offence of assault 
and given conditional discharges. This lower conviction rate of those 
accused of sexual assault (25%) as compared to those accused of 
physical assault (75%) was statistically significant, ")£ll)=3.75, p<.05, 
as shown in Table 11. 
Table 11 
Comparison of Verdicts of Sample Cases 
Guilty Not Guilty 
Sexual Assault 1 3 
Physical Assault 15 5 
X^D=3.75, p<.05 
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A comparison of sentences of sexual assault and physical assault 
cases in the primary sample of cases could not be examined since only 
one of the five sexual assault cases was convicted and sentenced, as 
compared to the 15 physical assault cases. 
Secondary Sample. Sexual and physical assault trial that took 
place in Toronto in November and December of 19C4 and January 1985 were 
compared on sentence, that is, whether a dismissal was given or whether 
a sentence ranging from a conditional discharge to over three years 
incarceration was given. Results indicated that those accused of sexual 
assault were more likely to be given a dismissal than those accused of 
physical assaultjXvD3^.59, p<.03, as shown in Table 12. 
Although, the sample size of sexual assaults as compared to 
physical assaults was small in both the primary and the secondary 
sample of cases, findings emphasized a lighter treatment of sexual 
assault than of physical assault cases. That is, sexual assault accused 
were less likely to be convicted and, if convicted, more likely to be 
given a lighter sentence than those accused of physical assault. 
.Composition and Selection of Juries 
The assessment rolls were unavailable and thus the hypothesis that 
women are under-represented on assessment rolls and are not available 
for jury duty to the same extent as men could not be examined. 
Only two physical assault and two sexual assault cases had a 
judge and a jury. The proportion of men and women selected or rejected 
for both types of cases did not significantly differ from the 
proportion called for possible jury duty. These results are summarized 
in Table 13a and 13b. 
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Table 12 
Comparison of Sentences of Trials that took place in 
Metropolitan Toronto in November and December, 1984 
and January 1985 
Dismissed Sentenced 
Sexual Assault 8 
Physical Assault 64 
5 
138 
X(D=4.59, P<-03 
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Table 13a 
Composition of Juries for Sexual Assault Cases 
Accepted Rejected 
Women 12 20 
Men 12 21 
%(!) = .03, p<.87 
Table 13b 
Composition of Juries for Physical Assault Cases 
Accepted Rejected 
Women 10 17 
Men 14 18 
%(!) = .07, p<.79 
75 
Due to the small sample size of jury cases, the hypothesis that 
the absence of women on a sexual assault jury will be more likely to 
result in an acquittal when compared to a physical assault trial could 
not be examined. 
Statistical Comparison Before and After Chanpes to the Criminal Code. 
A comparison was made between the 10 year data (1973-1982) and 
1933 data on Criminal Code offences. Specifically, the means and the 
standard deviations for the 10 year data were calculated for all 
offences on the number reported and the percentage founded, cleared and 
charged (See Appendix E). The standard deviations were then used to set 
confidence limits for the 10 year data to assess whether the number 
reported and the percentage founded, cleared and charged for 1933 fell 
within these same limits, that is, whether there were any significant 
differences under Bill C-127, as shown in Table 14. 
For the combined total sexual assaults (rape and indecent male and 
female assault), there was a significant increase in the percentage 
cleared and charged for 1933. Specifically, the percentage of total 
sexual assaults cleared and charged for 1983 (53%, 36%) fell 
significantly above the expected confidence limit calculated for the 10 
year data (48%+/-4.15%, 31%+/-2.97%). 
The percentage of total sexual assaults founded and cleared for 
1983 (36%, 53%) fell significantly below the confidence limit 
calculated for physical assault for the 10 year data (93%+/-2.10%, 
74%+/-2.87%). However, the percentage of total sexual assault charged 
for 1983 (36%) fell significantly above the confidence limit calculated 
for physical assault for the 10 year data (31%+/-2.40%). 
Table fty. 
Confidence Liaits for p<.01 Based on Ten Year Period for 
Evaluating 1983 Statistics 
n Reported Z Founded Z Cleared Z Charged 
10 year 1983 10 year 1983 10 year 1983 10 year 1983 
Rape 
Indecent 
Assault 
Total Sexual 
Assault 
Other Sex 
Offences 
Total Sexual 
Offenses 
Physical 
Assault 
Hcaicide 
Break and 
Enter 
Robbery 
Motor 
Vehicle Theft 
Theft over 
$280 
3,132+/- 952 
10,858+/- 2,324 
11,060+/- 3,003 
2,936+/- 461 
13,991+/- 3,028 
115,854+/- 28,211 
1,436+/- 463 
304,893+/-151,309 
21,826+/- 10,888 
99,122+/- 19,720 
16i,212+/-212,424 
na 
na 
13,851 
3,194 
17,045* 
137,047 
1,643 
379,629 
25,031 
86,917 
302,695 
66Z+/-7.32 
91%+/- .95 
B4Z+/-2.69 
98Z+/-2.00 
85Z+/-2.12Z 
93X+/-2.10Z 
94X+/-2.05Z 
95Z+/-1.08Z 
96Z+/-2.20Z 
B8Z+/-1.38X 
95Z+/-3.60Z 
na 
na 
86Z 
92Z* 
87Z 
94Z 
95% 
95Z 
97% 
87Z 
97Z 
40Z+/-2.12 
51Z+/-5.81 
48Z+/-4.15 
53Z+/-9.16 
49Z+/-4.71Z 
74Z+/-2.87Z 
80X+/-6.55X 
22Z+/-1.56X 
38Z+/-3.10X 
22Z+/-2.59Z 
13Z+/-4.71Z 
na 
na 
53%* 
62Z* 
55Z* 
75Z 
SIX 
22Z 
m 
22Z 
HZ 
28Z+/-1.92 
33Z+/-3.97 
31Z+/-2.97 
35Z+/-6.53 
32Z+/-3.35Z 
31Z+/-2.40X 
73Z+/-6.20X 
15Z+/-2.82X 
26Z+/-4.63X 
15Z+/-4.33X 
BZ+/-3.4BZ 
na 
na 
36Z* 
47Z* 
38Z* 
37Z* 
74Z 
14Z 
24Z 
13Z 
7Z 
na=Not Available, *=p<.01 
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Discussion 
Hypothesis A-lSimilarity of Charge 
The prediction that those accused of a sexual assault will be 
charged at a lower level than those accused of a physical assault was 
not supported. Findings revealed that those accused of sexual assault 
and those accused of physical assault were significantly under-charged, 
considering the level of force used. In fact, only 10 of the 27 cases 
charged reflected the level of force used by the accused. 
Considering the level of physical and mental harm experienced by 
the victim, the criminal justice system appears to be very lenient in 
charging those accused of assault. This under-charging serves to 
further victimize assault victims. 
As noted in the literature review, when compared to other 
criminal code offences, rape was the least reported and the least 
brought to justice (Canadian Urban Victimization Survey, 1983; Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women, 1976; Haines, 1975; Cooper and 
t . 7« -J , - ! , « , . „ 1 Q 7 Q . ~~A l.l^^A 1 0 7 0 n c x i i wc x£^ , x - / / u , e m u n u u u | x . * / - / / . 
It is this double victimization, that is, victimization first by 
the rapist and then by society that results in the low reporting rate 
of rape (Weiss and Borges, 1973). However, according to these findings, 
both sexual and physical assault victims are blamed for the crime and 
consequently the accused are under-charged for the crime. 
The author asserts that this under-charging minimizes the social 
importance of assault. That is, it minimizes the seriousness of the 
offence with regards to social values. As noted by the Advisory Council 
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on the Status of Women (1976), a law which is seldom applied is hardly 
a deterrent. Hartwig and Sandler (1977) emphasize that resistance to 
the utmost is required of rape victims, whereas, it is not expected of 
a robbery victim to engage in a life-death struggle with the assailant. 
Assault is only recognized and treated as any other offence when the 
victim can show brutal physical harm received. That is, only when 
victims of assault have broken bones and bruises is the assault taken 
seriously. The social values reflected in this assessment of victims is 
that in order to be above blame (i.e., to avoid victim blaming) and the 
resulting double victimization, the victim must have physical injury to 
prove his or her case. 
Although Bill C-127 eliminated the need for corroboration so that 
victims who received little or no physical harm would be seriously 
treated by the criminal justice system, the above findings indicate 
that the physical harm received by both sexual and physical assault 
victims is not being adequately accounted for even under Bill C-127. 
The implication is that both types of victims are seen as responsible 
for what happened, and that equating rape with physical assault was 
perhaps no gain at all. 
Hypothesis A-2Similarity of Process 
The prediction that victims of sexual assault will be subjected to 
questions which attack their credibility and character more than 
victims of physical assault was supported. Specifically, the defence 
asked proportionally more consent questions of sexual than of physical 
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assault victims. 
There was a significant difference in the question-asking 
strategies between the prosecutor and the defence. The defence, as 
compared to the prosecutor, asked a greater number of questions in both 
sexual and physical assault cases. The defence also used a greater 
variety of tones and types of questions with the purpose of attacking 
the character and credibility of both types of victims. 
The significant difference in the use of tone in both types of 
cases by lawyers can be attributed to the dramatic difference in the 
number of negative and neutral questions posed. That is, In both types 
of cases, positive questions were rarely posed by both lawyers, 
whereas, significantly more negative questions were posed by the 
defence than by the prosecutor. The significant difference in the use 
of stage of question by lawyers in both types of cases can be 
attributed to the defence posing a significantly greater number of 
incidence scene questions in sexual assault cases, and more than twice 
as many meeting accused questions in physical assault than did the 
prosecutor. Similarly, the significant difference in the use of type of 
question in both types of cases can be attributed to the greater number 
of credibility questions posed by the defence than by the prosecutor. 
Bill C-127 attempted to desex rape and equate it to physical 
assault by disallowing questions that attack the character and 
credibility of victims. However, the results showed that the defence 
also attacked the character and credibility of physical assault 
victims. Specifically, the defence asked a greater proportion of 
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consent questions of sexual as compared to physical assault victims. 
The examples below of consent questions asked by the defence in the 
sexual assault cases observed, illustrate the controversy over the 
retention of consent questions under Bill C-127. 
"Do you recall meeting Mr. X by the bar and 
wanting to talk to him?" 
"You wanted to go into his car?" 
"You didn't want your brother to know because you 
consented?" 
"Are you prepared to say that you were more or 
less accepting?" 
"Are you saying that he half-pulled you 
upstairs...then you didn't lead him, he didn't 
follow you upstairs?" 
Since questions on corroboration, sexual history and recency of 
complaint are no longer permissable, it seemed as if the defence took 
advantage of what was still permissable under Bill C-127. The defence 
attacked the victim on her consent or non-consent to be "sexual" rather 
than on the assault itself. Specifically, the defence attempted to 
blame sexual assault victims for consenting to the act. As noted in the 
literature review, lack of consent is legally unprovable. So this 
leaves the victim virtually defenseless against this line of attack. 
The above is particularly relevant in light of the fact that 
physical assault victims were not asked any consent questions. In fact, 
the defence attacked only the credibility of physical assault victims. 
Thus, there was no question as to whether physical assault victims 
actually wanted to be physically assaulted. However, as illustrated in 
the above results, the defence built its case on the supposed 
willingness or desire of sexual assault victim to be sexually 
assaulted. As noted earlier, one major criticism of Bill C-127 was the 
comparability of rape to physical assault, the above findings may well 
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support this. 
Results indicated that except for present time, lawyers 
significantly reversed their strategies with regards to stage of 
question depending upon the type of case. The defence asked 
proportionally more prior to incidence and incidence scene questions of 
sexual assault victims and proportionally more meeting accused and 
after incidence questions of physical assault victims. 
As noted in the literature review, for sexual assault cases, the 
defence focuses on the issue of consent by developing its case on the 
sexual history and moral character of the victim. Although Bill C-127 
disallows questions on sexual history, it appeared that the defence 
still attempted to question on this indirectly. The defence focused on 
prior to incidence and the incidence scene and, in doing so, exposed 
the personality of the victim and her behavior before and during the 
incidence. In addition, only information and consent questions were 
asked, thus, the defence's attack was very direct in focusing personal 
blame on the victim. 
This contrasts with the nature of the case the defence built for 
physical assault. The defence focused on meeting accused before and 
after the incidence, thus more on the events leading up to and 
following the incidence. In addition, only information and credibility 
questions were asked. Thus, again, the attack was very direct but it 
essentially verified the behavior of the victim rather than accusing 
the victim of consenting to be physically assaulted. Therefore, the 
blame was more situational than personal. 
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In constrast, the prosecutor asked proportionally more meeting 
accused, after incidence, and present time questions, of sexual assault 
victims and proportionally more prior to incidence and incidence scene 
questions, of physical assault victims. With regard to type and tone of 
question, proportionally more neutral information questions were asked. 
Therefore, because the prosecutor did not object or use positive 
questions to offset the forceful and negative attitude of the defence, 
the prosecutor was not as effective. This passiveness on the part of 
the prosecutor apppeared to reflect a lack of motivation in defending 
the victim. 
There could be two possible reasons for the prosecutor using the 
above strategy. One reason may lie in the prosecutor's attempt to gain 
the sympathy of the judge and the jury, that is, focusing on after the 
incidence and present time in order to show how traumatic the 
experience was for the victim. The other more plausible reason could be 
that it was necessary to show that the victim was upset, thus proving 
in the absence of broken bones that the sex was unwanted, that she did 
not consent and that it was not her fault. However, if the latter is 
the reason for the prosecutor's difference in strategy, then it appears 
as if the old attitude inherent in the obsolete rape laws still exists. 
That is, sexual assault is a more personal experience, with the defence 
indirectly focusing on the victim's past and insinuating she wanted or 
caused the sex, and the prosecutor responding with the damaging 
after-effects. 
Although the court experience of sexual assault victims can be 
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described as particularly gruelling due to the issue of consent and the 
personal nature of sexual assault, the court experience of physical 
assault victims was also very negative. It appears that in both types 
of cases, the aim of the defence was to derogate and blame the victim. 
This was evident in the negative tone, stage and accusatory types of 
questions asked in both types of cases. 
It is important to note that variables such as sex of victim, sex 
of accused and tactic of questions asked by lawyers may have served to 
confound the data. For example, the defence often repeated a question 
several times or in several ways in order to discredit and confuse the 
victim. In addition, the sex of the victim or the accused may have 
influenced the choice of strategy employed by lawyers. This is 
particularly relevant since the treatment of all five female sexual 
assault victims was compared to the treatment of all 22 victims of 
physical assault, even though only six victims of physical assault were 
female. 
Hypothesis A-3:Similarity of Conviction 
As noted earlier in the literature review, rape as compared to 
other crimes has the lowest conviction rate (Cooper and Weinberg, 1978 
and Clark and Lewis, 1977). The results from this study support this 
established fact. The low conviction rates continue to ensure that the 
crime of sexual assault is not brought to justice even under Bill 
C-127. 
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Hypotheses B1-B3:Composition and Selection of Juries 
Due to the fact that only four of 27 cases observed had a judge 
and a jury, no major conclusions could be made. 
'Ivpothesis Cl-3:Statistical Comparison Before and After Changes to the 
Criminal Code 
The prediction that if the changes in the criminal code to sexual 
assault had the desired effect, there will be a larger change in sexual 
assault was supported and that there will be a similarity to physical 
assault was not supported. There was a significant increase in the 
percentage cleared and charged for 1983. In comparison to physical 
assault, the percentage of total sexual assaults (rape and indecent 
assault) founded and cleared were significantly lower than the 
percentage of physical assaults founded and cleared for 1983. However, 
there was a similarity in the number of physical and sexual offences 
chareed for 1983. 
It is questionable whether Bill C-127 has been effective in 
dealing with sexual assault. There was still a greater percentage of 
physical as compared to sexual assaults that were founded and cleared. 
Although there was a significant increase in the percentage of total 
sexual assaults charged, there was a similar increase in the percentage 
of physical assaults charged. Thus, the new law seemed to have a 
sensitizing effect on the police, causing more assaults of all types to 
be charged. 
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From the above discussion, it appears that even under Bill C-127, 
the belief in a just world, and the consequent blaming of the victim is 
still maintained. Sexual and physical assault victims continue to be 
held responsible for their victimization. This is apparent in the 
significant under-charging for both types of assaults, the negative 
court experience of assault victims, as well as in the low conviction 
rates for sexual assault. 
The crime of assault, and in particular sexual assault, is of a 
more personal nature and directly more threatening to individuals than 
other crimes such as break and enter. This exclusive status along with 
socially held myths of sexual assault have been used by individuals to 
reduce the potential threat of possible sexual assault. Consequently, 
victims are asked accusatory questions focusing on credibility and 
consent. By emphasizing the victim's responsibility for the assault, 
the threat is alleviated and the belief in a just world is restored. 
That is, women are only sexually assaulted if they allow it or want to 
u„ - 11., n « j 
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The need to maintain a belief in a just world is so evident that 
victims are probed on psychological motives to be raped and physical 
evidence of not resisting enough. Indeed, the acknowledgement that 
innocent victims can be raped is such a threat to the belief in a just 
world, as noted earlier, bruises on victim's body have often been 
attributed to vigorous love-making. 
Minimizing the seriousness of the assault as evidenced in the 
criminal justice procedures contributes to a denial of the problem and 
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the subsequent blaming of the victim. The belief in a just world well 
explains this response to the large and complex problem of assault, 
where no ready solutions or compensations to the victim can be easily 
effected. 
As indicated earlier, the just world hypothesis serves as a 
rationale for both individuals and larger groups or societies of 
people. When a significant social problem such as assault is 
consistently dealt with in such a manner that many offenders go free, 
while the victims are blamed, it is time to examine the situation in an 
attempt to identify the real source of the problem. Despite the best 
intentions of society to deal with this problem through changes in the 
legal system, sexual and physical assault continue to be significantly 
under-charged with sexual assault also being significantly 
under-reported and under-convicted. Furthermore, women continue to be 
blamed for their own victimization by more subtle lines of 
cross-examination, which still presupposes that the victim and not the 
r*£-Pr***Ae*-~ ^V.««.1*4 U « « « *- -^  -! « 1 T H n -t« -C. ,-~ 4-L ~ ~ ,- ~ .! — C — — 3 1 1 C^\.1 1 
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by the victim and the consequent verification of their own belief in a 
just world. 
If assault and in particular sexual assault is not dealt with 
effectively by society, this, in effect makes the crime legal. It is 
clear from the first tentative steps toward legal reform as evidenced 
in Bill C-127, that society does not wish to tolerate such criminal 
activity. However, it would seem from the inability of the law to 
effect justice that the problem may be larger and more complex than can 
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be dealt with through the passing of a single bill. 
Since women have traditionally been dealt with unjustly in myth 
and in history, it has been very difficult to overcome a sense of guilt 
of such proportions. In society's inability to cope with social 
inequality and violence toward women, the concept of a just world is 
threatened and society alleviates fear and guilt by denying the problem 
and by blaming the victim. 
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Conclusion 
As indicated in the literature review, there were mixed reactions 
to Bill C-127. Some critics believed that it would increase the number 
of reports of sexual assault, make the victim's experience less 
traumatic and result in more charges and convictions of sexual assault. 
Other critics questioned the retention of consent and the desexing of 
rape. 
The results of this study raise questions as to why Bill C-127 
equated rape to physical assault since victim s of physical assault 
cases were treated as poorly as victim s of sexual assault cases in 
areas of charging the accused, and the court experience of the victim. 
In recognition of the fact that rape is the fastest growing crime in 
North America (Cooper and Weinberg, 1978), changes under Bill C-127 can 
be described as purely token changes by the criminal justice system 
Q'lr tpe r"Vio nam ant-a oa o-F f n t a l c o v i i a l s c c a n l t - c fr\\\i\AoA a-riA p l o a r o H t ja o 
significantly lower than the percentage for physical assaults. In 
addition, sexual assault cases still had lower convictions than 
physical assault cases and sexual assault victims continued to face an 
ordeal in court with regards to the issue of consent. However, no 
questions on corroboration, sexual history and credibility were asked. 
It was concluded that this served to confirm the belief in a just world 
and the consequent blaming of the victim, even when evidence was 
presented to the contrary. It appears that the intent of Bill C-127 is 
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not, as of yet, being realized. The findings of this study, although 
necessarily limited in scope due to the recency of Bill Cl-27, are 
nevertheless indicative of what may follow if the present trends 
continue. It is recommended that this kind of evaluation be conducted 
periodically. In this way, Bill C-127 can be monitored for its 
effectiveness according to its intent. 
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Appendix A: Court Observation Questionnaire 
TRIAL OBSERVATION DATA SHEET 
1. TRIAL 
DATE. 
2. PHYSICAL ASSAULT 
3. VICTIM: MALE 
4. ACCUSED: MALE 
5. JURY COMPOSITION: 
LEVEL 
FEMALE 
FEMALE 
MALES 
i 
FEMALES 
SEXUAL ASSAULT 
OUTCOME 
A. VERDICT 
B. SENTENCE 
C. SPOKE TO SENTENCE 
Guilty + 
Not Guilty 
Discharge: 
Absolute 1 
Conditional 2 
Suspended Sentence 3 
Fine 4 
Incarceration: 
Intermittent 5 
Short 6 
Lengthy 7 
Penitentiary . 8 
Defence +• 
Crown + 
D. RFCORD CONDITIONS/FINF/RECOMMFNnATTONS: 
TIME! OBSERVER 
LEVEL. 
Record Conditions Below 
Record Fine Below 
Under Three Months 
Three Months to Two Years 
Over Two years 
Yes (Record Recommendations Below) 
No 
Yes (Record Recommendations Below) 
No 
X 
o 96 
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Appendix B: Severity of Level of Force Used by the Offender 
Scale 
96 
LEVEL OF FORCE USED BY THE OFFENDER 
The victim will be questioned first by the Crown and second by the Defense. As 
soon as the Crown completes its questions, but before the defense begins, check 
the ONE item below which best describes the alleged level of force: 
1. Direct Verbal Threat/Assault. 
(Examples: "Take your pants off or I will tear them off." "Come 
with me." "Hold still." "You are not leaving now.") 
2. Verbal Threat of Use of Force. 
(Examples: "I will punch you if you make any noise." If you don't 
want to get hurt hold still." "If you care about you!kids take 
you pants off.") 
3. Verbal Threat of Harm. 
(Examples: "I'll break your arm if you try to leave." "I will 
strangle you if you struggle.") 
4. Mild Physical Force: 
(a) EITHER restraining and holding the person 
(Examples: Holding car door shut. Holding or lea.nir.e- body on 
victim to keep her from leaving. 
(b) OR implying a weapon. 
(Examples: "I have a gun." "I will cut your face.") 
5. Both (a) and (b) from item #4. 
6. Stronger Physical Force: 
(a) EITHER using physical force which does not leave a mark. 
(Examples: Shoving, pushing, carrying, or binding) 
(b) OR showing but not using a weapon. 
(Examples: "See this knife..," or, showing the knife.) 
7. Both (a) and (b) from item # 6. 
8. Major Physical Force: 
(a) EITHER uses weapon 
(Examples: Holds the knife to the victim's throat, points gun.) 
(b) OR hurts the victim 
(Examples: punches, kicks, or twists arm; hurts victim and 
causes bruises, bleeding, or pain. No permanent scares or marks.) 
9. Both (a) and (b) from item # 8. 
10. Bodily harm requiring medical attention. Recoverable physical harm. 
(Examples: Broken bones, stitches) 
11. Bodily harm causing permanent effect. 
(Examples: a scar, limp, or disfigurement.) 
12. Endangers the victim's life. 
(Examples: thrown in a ditch. Left bleeding and exposed. 
Discharged a gun. Shot or stabbed victim.) 
13. Both items 10 and 12. 
14. Both items 11 and 12. 
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Appendix C: Jury Selection Questionnaire 
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 HXS 
;-'age ; 
FEMALE- She must have a skirt and blouse, sweats", infernal pant suit cr cress, 
or pants i;ith a top having a collar. A tcp without a collar is informal only if 
it is specifically a female style which is dressier t'han a typical unise;; 
•coliar less shirt. Cords would usually be considered informal and Jeans casual 
though rating emphasis should bs given to the tcp for persons having an an 
informal tcp but casual pants. 
CASUAL: 
' >. I S " 
MALE- He will have on a T-shirt, decaled shirt, sweatshirt- or another 
ccilarlass shirt. Shorts are always ccr.sidared casual while jeans and sneakers 
are casual unless the parson also has a shirt -jith a collar in iiihicn caia he 
would be rated informal. 
FEMALE- She will have on a T-shi^t, decaled shirt, sweatshirt cr 
collarless shirt (excluding more dressier types specifically wcrn by 
Shcrts are always considered casual while jeans and sneakers are casual unlss 
the person has a tcp with a collar or a dressy top without a collar in which 
case she would be rated informal. 
APPEARANCE: 
NEAT- The parson is neat, i.e., clothes fit and ars reasonably clean withcut 
hcles or tears, hair is brushed and clothes are tucked in. 
SLOPPY- The person is generally dirty and/cr ragged, i.e., clot-as tsa^ have 
holes or be dirty, faded and/or torn. Hair may be unkapt and clothes fray not 
tucked in. T);e person has taken r-o evident care in appearance, 
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JURY SELECTION DATA SHEET 
•RUCTIONS: 
it the number of people in the room, and break the number down into males and females. 
s 
les 
1 
Name of Case: 
Date: 
Observer: 
ER 
OCCUPA.:AGE 
(See :N-
Code :Years 
Manual):in 
:5's 
SEX 
(M)ale 
(F)emale 
B s a s s x a s a 
: RACE : 
s(W)hite: 
(B) lack: 
: ( 0 ) t h e r : 
_ ; 
DRESS 
(F)ormal 
(I)nformal 
(C)asual 
APPEAR. 
(N)eat 
(S)loppy 
OUTCOME OR REASON FOR REJECTION 
ACCEPT 
(Y)es 
(N)o 
STANDBY 
(Y)es 
(N)o 
REJECT 
REASON : BY 
• 
(N)one : (D)ef 
(C)ause: (C)rowr 
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Appendix D: Jury Panel Information Questionnaire 
/ 
For the month of: 
JURY PANEL INFORMATION 
Date: Court #: Observer's name: 
104 
MONTH 
Jan 
Feb 
etc. 
S's 
NUMBER 
ON 
JURY 
LIST 
AGE SEX 
n- (M)ale 
years (F)emale 
in 5's 
RACE 
(W)hite 
(B)lack 
(O)ther 
DRESS 
(F)ormal 
(I)nformal 
(C)asual 
APPEARANCE OCCUPA' 
(N)eat See 
(S)loppy Coding 
Manual 
X 
•ssxcsssseasssssa 
All missing data * 0 
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Appendix E: Statistical Comparison Before and After Changes 
to the Criminal Code 
Category Definition of Statistics Canada Crime and Enforcement Figures 
Reported 
A criminal incidence that is either brought or naturally comes to the 
attention of the police. The investigating police complete an 
occurrence report which forms the basis of the reporting system. The 
offence is recorded as a "reported offence". 
Founded 
Reported offences are subjected to a preliminary investigation to 
determine the validity of the report. Reports are categorized as 
unfounded if they may not have occurred or been attempted. Unfounded 
offences are subtracted from the number of reported offences to produce 
the number of actual or founded reports. 
Cleared 
This category is composed of the total offences cleared by charge and 
cleared otherwise. 
Cleared by Charge 
Actual offences are investigated and evidence is gathered. When the 
police believe that they know the identity of at least one of the 
individuals involved, an "information" is laid against the individual 
and the individual is formally charged with the offence. The laying of 
an investigation means that the offence can be "ciaared by charge" 
and this can happen even if the police have not apprehended the accused. 
Cleared Otherwise 
Actual offences can be MfilGtired otherwise". That is, in cases of 
diplomatic immunity or death of the alleged accused, the police cannot 
lay an information despite sufficient evidence. (Statistics Canada 
Crime and Enforcement Figures, 1985) 
TABLE 1 
NUMBER OF REPORTED 
OFFENCE : 
Rape : 
Indecent Assault : 
Total Sexual Assault: 
Other Sex Offences : 
Total Sex Offences : 
Assault : 
Hosicide : 
Break and Enter : 
Robbery : 
Motor Vehicle Theft . 
Theft Over $200 
TOTAL OF Mean 
/•ATrcADtrc 
LnltUvnlLa 
ABOVE SD 
1973 : 
2,530 : 
na : 
na : 
na : 
13,945 : 
97,568 : 
1,074 : 
210,571 : 
13,958 : 
82,189 
68,651 
61,310 
71,367 
1974 : 
2,868 : 
7,174 : 
10,042 : 
3,104 : 
13,146 : 
104,847 : 
1,209 : 
246,622 : 
17,852 : 
95,264 
85,112 
: 53,385 
: 75,794 
1975 : 
2,843 : 
6,893 : 
9,736 : 
3,067 : 
12,803 : 
109,860 : 
1,425 : 
274,974 : 
22,194 : 
102,080 
: 100,403 
: 58,752 
: 84,279 
1976 : 
2,915 : 
7,019 : 
9,934 : 
2,641 : 
12,575 : 
113,264 : 
1,429 : 
282,757 : 
20,857 : 
99,442 : 
111,054 : 
: 60,353 : 
: 87,002 : 
1977 : 
2,987 : 
7,298 : 
10,285 : 
2,708 : 
12,993 : 
112,022 : 
1,487 : 
285,785 
20,375 
96,610 
119,689 
61,113 
88,068 
1978 : 
3,089 : 
7,598 : 
10,687 : 
2,933 : 
13,620 : 
113,784 : 
1,473 : 
294,304 : 
20,647 i 
: 95,159 
: 136,613 
: 63,628 
: 91,406 
1979 : 
3,388 : 
8,169 : 
11,557 : 
2,833 : 
14,390 : 
120,490 : 
1,466 : 
313,816 : 
21,723 • 
104,147 
: 177,464 
: 70,858 
: 100,503 
1980 : 
3,446 : 
8,631 : 
12,077 : 
2,921 : 
14,998 : 
124,375 : 
1,468 : 
366,779 : 
25,410 : 
106,998 
: 232,984 
: 81,826 
: 119,662 
1981 : 
3,625 : 
8,751 : 
12,376 : 
3,051 : 
15,427 : 
128,631 : 
1,628 : 
385,037 : 
27,142 : 
109,802 
275,214 
i 88,244 
: 129,681 
1982 
3,633 
9,215 
12,848 
3,164 
16,012 
133,699 
1,697 
388,280 
28,105 
99,527 
: 304,931 
: 91,010 
: 134,810 
na=Not Available 
TABLE 2 
FOUNDED PERCENTAGES 
(Reported/Founded) 
OFFENCE : 1973 : 1974 : 1975 : 1976 : 1977 : 1978 : 1979 : 1980 : 1981 : 1982 : 
Rape : 632 : 642 : 652 : 632 : 632 : 652 : 682 : 672 : 712 : 702 : 
Indecent Assault : na : 912 : 912 : 912 : 912 : 912 : 912 : 912 : 912 : 922 : 
Total Sexual Assault: na : 832 : 832 : 832 : 832 : 842 : 842 : 842 : 852 : 862 : 
Other Sex Offences : na : 892 : 912 : 912 : 902 : 902 : 912 : 902 : 912 : 912 : 
Total Sex Offences : 862 : 852 : 852 : 842 : 842 : 852 : 862 : 852 : 862 : 872 : 
Assault : 922 : 922 : 932 : 932 : 932 : 932 : 942 : 942 : 942 : 942 : 
Hoiicide : 952 : 932 : 942 : 952 : 942 : 952 : 942 : 942 : 952 : 952 : 
Break and Enter : 942 : 952 : 952 : 952 : 952 : 952 : 942 : 952 : 952 : 952 : 
Robbery : 942 : 952 : 962 : 962 : 962 : 952 : 962 : 972 : 972 : 972 : 
Motor Vehicle Theft : 872 : 872 : 892 : 882 : 872 : 872 : 882 : 882 : 882 : 872 : 
Theft Over $200 : 922 : 942 : 962 : 952 : 952 : 952 : 962 : 962 : 972 : 972 : 
TOTAL OF Mean : 882 : 882 : 892 : 882 : 882 : 892 : 892 : 892 : 902 : 902 : 
InltWrtlLa • • 
ABOVE SD : 112 : 102 : 92 : 102 : 92 : 92 : 82 : 92 : 82 : 82 : 
na=Not Available 
TABLE 3 
CLEARED PERCENTAGES 
(Reported/Cleared) 
OFFENCE : 1973 : 1974 : 1975 : 1976 : 1977 : 1978 : 1979 : 1980 : 1981 : 1982 : 
Rape : 402 : 392 : 402 : 392 : 382 : 402 : 402 : 402 : 392 : 392 : 
Indecent Assault : na : 482 : 482 : 502 : 532 : 522 : 532 : 522 : 532 : 532 : 
Total Sexual Assault: na : 452 : 452 : 472 : 492 : 492 : 492 : 482 : 492 : 492 : 
Other Sex Offences : na : 492 : 472 : 512 : 512 : 582 : 552 : 542 : 542 : 562 J 
Total Sex Offences : 482 : 462 : 462 : 482 : 492 : 512 : 502 : 502 : 502 : 512 
Assault : 762 : 742 : 722 : 722 : 732 : 742 : 742 : 752 : 742 : 742 
Hoiicide : 822 : 782 : 732 : 792 : 792 : 812 : 802 : 822 : 802 : 802 
Break and Enter : 232 : 222 : 222 : 232 : 232 : 232 : 222 : 222 : 222 : 212 
Robbery : 312 : 292 : 292 : 312 : 322 : 312 : 292 : 382 : 292 : 282 
Motor Vehicle Theft : 232 : 222 : 222 : 232 : 232 : 242 : 222 : 222 : 212 : 202 
Theft Over «200 : 162 : 142 : 132 : 132 : 132 : 122 : 122 : 112 : 112 : 102 
TOTAL OF Mean : 422 : 422 : 412 : 432 : 442 : 452 : 442 : 442 : 442 : 442 
PATT/iflDTFG .. . . 
WMLUVIUCD 
ABOVE SD : 252 : 202 : 202 : 202 : 212 : 212 : 222 : 222 : 222 : 222 
na=Not Available 
TABLE 4 
CHARGED PERCENTAGES 
(Reported/Charged) 
OFFENCE : 1973 : 1974 : 1975 : 1976 : 1977 : 1978 : 1979 : 1988 : 1981 : 1982 : 
Rape : 272 : 282 : 282 : 282 : 282 : 292 : 292 : 292 : 292 : 292 : 
Indecent Assault : na : 302 : 302 : 322 : 342 : 342 : 342 : 322 : 332 : 342 : 
Total Sexual Assault: na : 302 : 292 : 312 : 322 : 322 : 322 : 312 : 322 : 322 : 
Other Sex Offences : na : 332 : 322 : 332 : 352 : 402 : 362 : 342 : 362 : 382 : 
Total Sex Offences : 312 : 312 : 302 : 312 : 332 : 342 : 332 : 322 : 332 : 332 : 
Assault : 302 : 312 : 302 : 302 : 322 : 322 : 322 : 322 : 322 : 312 : 
Hoticide : 742 : 722 : 672 : 722 : 742 : 752 : 742 : 762 : 732 : 732 : 
Break and Enter : 162 : 152 : 152 : 162 : 162 : 162 : 142 : 142 : 142 : 142 : 
Robbery : 272 : 252 : 262 : 272 : 282 : 282 : 242 : 252 : 242 : 232 : 
Motor Vehicle Theft : 162 : 162 : 162 : 162 : 162 : 162 : 132 : 132 : 122 : 122 : 
Theft Over $200 : 102 : 92 : 82 : 82 : 82 : 82 : 72 : 62 : 62 : 62 : 
TOTAL OF Mean : 292 : 292 : 282 : 302 : 302 : 312 : 302 : 292 : 292 : 302 : 
fATTf-flBTn , , 
UtlLUUrULO ----- , . — , 
ABOVE SD : 202 : 162 : 152 : 162 : 172 : 172 i 182 : 182 : 182 : 182 : 
na=Not Available 
TABLES 
1972 - 1982 
OFFENCE 
Rape 
Indecent Assault 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Total Sexual Assault: 
Other Sex Offences 
Total Sex Offences 
Assault 
Hoiicide 
Break and Enter 
Robbery 
Motor Vehicle Theft 
Theft Over $200 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
a 
• 
• 
• 
* 
• 
Reported 
Mean • 
3,132 : 
7,861 : 
11,060 : 
2,936 : 
13,991 : 
115,854 : 
1,436 : 
304,892 : 
21,826 : 
99,122 : 
161,211 : 
• 
a 
SD : 
372 : 
853 : 
1,173 : 
180 : 
1183 : 
11,020 : 
181 : 
59,105 : 
4,253 : 
7,703 : 
82,978 : 
2 Founded 
Mean : 
662 : 
912 : 
842 : 
902 : 
852 : 
932 : 
942 : 
952 : 
962 : 
882 : 
952 : 
» 
SD : 
• — • — • - - — — i — 
2.862 : 
.372 : 
1.052 : 
.782 : 
.832 : 
.B22 : 
.802 : 
.422 : 
.862 : 
.542 : 
1.402 : 
2 Cleared 
Mean : 
402 : 
512 : 
482 : 
532 : 
492 : 
742 : 
802 : 
222 : 
302 : 
222 : 
132 : 
SD 
.832 
2.272 
1.622 
3.582 
1.842 
1.122 
2.562 
.612 
1.212 
1.012 
1.842 
• 
« 
• 
• 
* 
a 
• 
a 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
2 Charged 
Mean : 
282 : 
332 : 
312 : 
352 : 
322 : 
312 : 
732 : 
152 : 
262 : 
152 : 
82 : 
a 
SD : 
.752 : 
1.552 : 
1.162 : 
2.552 : 
1.312 : 
.932 : 
2.422 : 
1.102 : 
1.812 : 
1.692 : 
1.362 : 
2 Convicted 
Mean 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
: SD 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
na=Not Available 
TABLE 6 
1983 
a 
• 
OFFENCE • 
• 
• 
Total Sexual Assault: 
Other Sex Offences : 
Total Sex Offences : 
Assault : 
Hcaicide : 
Break and Enter : 
Robbery : 
Motor Vehicle Theft : 
Theft Over $200 : 
Reported 
Number 
13,851 
3,194 
17,045 
137,047 
1,643 
379,629 
25,031 
86,917 
302,695 
: Founded 
: N : 
: 11,932 : 
: 2,940 : 
: 14,872 : 
: 129,334 : 
: 1,562 : 
: 362,376 : 
: 24,274 : 
: 75,988 : 
: 292,973 : 
2 
862 
922 
872 
942 
952 
952 
972 
872 
972 
: Cleared 
: N : 
.: 7,348 : 
: 1,972 : 
: 9,320 : 
:102,210 : 
: 1,330 : 
: 82,587 : 
: 7,317 : 
: 18,739 : 
: 33,267 : 
2 
532 
622 
552 
752 
812 
222 
292 
222 
112 
: Charged 
: N : 
: 4,959 : 
: 1,494 : 
: 6,453 : 
: 50,412 : 
: 1,221 : 
: 52,519 : 
: 6,129 : 
: 11,550 : 
: 19,785 : 
2 
362 
472 
382 
372 
742 
142 
252 
132 
72 
• 
• 
a 
i 
a 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• » 
a 
• 
• 
• 
2 Convicted 
Mean 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
i SD 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
: na 
na=Not Available 
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Appendix F: Sexual Assault Manual 
/ 
TRIAL OBSERVATION DATA SHEET INSTRUCTIONS: SEXUAL ASSAULT 
1. Complete information as to trial characteristics on front page. 
2. Circle whether the defense lawyer or crown prosecutor is posing question on each data sheet. 
3. Write posed question as completely as possible. A dash (—) is to be used to indicate a new question. Questions 
'chunked' together by the lawyer are to be separated ONLY if enough time was given to the witness to 
answer. If time was not given, use a commas to indicate one single lengthy question. 
4. Indicate the emotional tone of the question using 0, + or -. 
0 -Neutral question 
+ -Question used to credit victim 
- -Question used to discredit victim 
5. Tick off which stage the question is about. 
6. Tick off the type of question. 
7. Complete outcome of trial on front page. 
DEFINITION OF STAGES OF INCIDENCE 
I. PRIOR TO INCIDENCE: 
Focuses on descriptive and factual information prior to victim even meeting accused. 
II. MEETING ACCUSED: 
Focuses on actual time of victim meeting accused. 
III. INCIDENCE SCENE: 
Focuses on actual events of the assault, i.e., unwanted contact. 
IV. AFTER INCIDENCE: 
Focuses on when victim and accused are separated, getting away from scene of assault and reporting procedures. 
V. PRESENT TIME: 
Focuses on preliminary hearing, court procedures ft present time. Also, questions asked in present tense by the 
lawyers and answered in present tense by the victim. 
VI. OUTCOME: 
Focuses on the verdict and sentence given to accused. 
DEFINITION OF CATEGORIES 
A. INFORMATION QUESTIONS: 
Any question that gives background as to the personality characteristics and life-style of the victim. Any question that 
details the scene of events in terms of time, scenery and action. 
B. CREDIBILITY QUESTIONS: 
Any question that validates or invalidates victim's story and credits or discredits victim's character. 
C. PAST HISTORY QUESTIONS: 
Any question that exposes the victim's moral character and past experiences (sexuality, fighting, etc.) 
D. CORROBORATION QUESTIONS: 
Any question that focuses on actual physical evidence that is brought to present at court, i.e.* witnesses, torn clothing ft 
exhibits. 
E. CONSENT QUESTIONS: 
Any question that indicates whether the victim desired and willingly allowed or actively resisted the contact with accused. 
F. OTHER QUESTIONS: 
Any question that does not fit into the above categories. 
STAGE OF INCIDENCE AND 
CATEGORY OF EACH STAGE 
EXAMPLE OF CONTENT 
OF CATEGORIES 
QUESTION TONE 
(+ Credit Victim) 
(- Discredit Victim) 
(0 Neutral) 
PRIOR TO INCIDENCE: 
A. Information 
Questions 
B. Credibility 
Questions 
C. Past History 
Questions 
Indentification 
of Victim 
Prior Relationship 
with Accused 
Social Stability 
Personal Relationship 
Stability 
Relationship with 
Family 
Relationship with 
Friends 
Drug Problem 
Alcohol Problem 
Frequency* 
Importance of ft 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
EXAMPLE OF POSSIBLE Manual Page 2 
QUESTION 
'What is your name?' 
'Is it true you work in a bar?' 
'At the time of the incidence you were only 17 
years old?' 
'Were you acquainted with X before?' 
'Is it true you were at one time friendly with 
X ?' 
'Is it true you did not know of X before?' 
'How long have you worked at your present job?' 
'Is it true that you have not held a job down 
for longer than three months this year?' 
"Is it true you have been working at your present 
job for over three years?* 
'Are you at present involved with someone?* 
'Is it true that you are presently separated?' 
'You have been married for over three years 
and two children* correct ?* 
'How close are you with your family?' 
'Is it true you left home at any early age?' 
'Isn't it correct that your family has been 
very support during this difficult time?' 
'Do you have alot of friends?' 
'Is it true you prefer to be a loner?' 
'Your friends have been supportive of 
of you during this time, correct?' 
'Have you ever experimented with drugs?' 
'You were once a regular user of marijuana?' 
'You were never involved with drugs?' 
'Do you drink?' 
'Is it true you drink regularly?' 
'Is it true you only drink on special 
occasions?" ,_, 
i — 1 
'Are you a virgin ' 
'Isn't true that you have an illegimate child?' 
STAGE OF INCIDENCE AND 
CATEGORY OF EACH STAGE 
EXAMPLE OF CONTENT 
OF CATEGORIES 
QUESTION TONE 
(+ Credit Victim) 
(- Discredit Victim) 
(0 Neutral) 
EXAMPLE OF POSSIBLE 
QUESTION 
Manual Page 3 
When Started M s it true you are involved with only one 
person?' 
D. Corroboration 
Questions 
'Did you know if X carried a weapon?' 
'You knew X was in the habit of carrying a 
weapon* didn't you?' 
'You had no way of knowing if X was armed?1 
E. Consent 
Questions 
Prior Relationship 
Nith Accused 
'Here you acquainted with X before?* 
'Is it true that you were at one time friendly 
with X ?' 
"You did not know of X before, did you?' 
II. MEETING ACCUSED 
A. Information 
Questions 
B. Credibility 
Questions 
C. Past History 
Questions 
D. Corroboration 
Questions 
E. Consent 
Questions 
Time* Scene* 
Action of Others, 
Action of Self ft 
Meeting Accused 
Clothing 
Action of Others 
Emotions Felt, 
Nature of Contact, 
Desire to Increase/ 
Decrease Contact 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
• 
0 
0 
+ 
•What time was it then?' 
"Why did you not leave when you had the 
chance?' 
'How did you try to avoid X?" 
'What were you wearing?' 
'You wore tight clothing?' 
'You were wearing conservative clothing?' 
"Have you been sexually assaulted before?" 
'You were sexually assaulted before, correct?" 
"In the past, you had always avoided being 
alone with X, hadn't you?" 
'Where were other people?' 
'Your friends were there, why did you not get 
their help?' 
'Others were trying to help you,correct?" 
"What were you feeling?" 
'Is it true you did not mind contact with X?' 
'Is it true you did not want contact with X?' 
\ STAGE OF INCIDENCE AND 
CATEGORY OF EACH STAGE 
EXAMPLE OF CONTENT 
OF CATEGORIES 
QUESTION TONE 
(+ Credit Victim) 
(- Discredit Victim) 
(0 Neutral) 
EXAMPLE OF POSSIBLE 
QUESTION 
Manual Page 4 
II. INCIDENCE SCENE 
A. Information 
Questions 
Description of 
Incidence 
'What happened then?' 
'Why were you alone with X ?' 
'You remember exactly what happened, don't you?" 
B. Credibility 
Questions 
'Are you sure you have left nothing out?' 
'It appears that there were many things you were 
wrong about, doesn't it?' 
"You say it is not in your nature to fight back, 
correct?* 
C. Past History 
Questions 
D. Corroboration 
Questions 
E. Consent 
Questions 
IV. AFTER INCIDENCE: 
A. Information 
Questions 
B. Credibility 
Questions 
C. Sexual History 
Questions 
Type of Force 
Applied ft Received 
Emotions Felt, 
Removal of Clothing ft 
Possible Escape 
Interaction/Physical 
Contact with Accused 
After Incidence 
Reasons for not 
Escaping Sooner, 
Route Taken ft 
Reporting Incidence 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
• 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
'Were you used to someone acting as X did?' 
"If it had been someone you liked, you would 
acted differently, correct?" 
'You kept hoping that X would stop, didn't you?' 
'How were you forced to submit?" 
'Why did you not scratch X's face?' 
'Is it true you kicked and scratched X ?' 
'What were you feeling?' 
'Did you remove your own clothing?" 
"You were planning your escape?" 
"What happened after attack?" 
"Why did you allow X to contact you again?" 
'Is it true you tried to avoid contact again?" 
'How did you leave scene of incidence?' 
'Why did you not report sooner?" 
'So you asked the first person you saw for help?* 
'How were your sexual relations after?' 
'You had no problems with sexual relations after 
the incidence, did you?" 
1 
STAGE OF INCIDENCE AND 
CATEGORY OF EACH STAGE 
EXAMPLE OF CONTENT 
OF CATEGORIES 
QUESTION TONE 
(+ Credit Victim) 
(- Discredit Victim) 
(0 Neutral) 
EXAMPLE OF POSSIBLE 
QUESTION 
Manual Page 5 
'You were not sexually comfortable with your 
partner for some time after the incidence* 
were you?* 
D. Corroboration 
Questions 
Clothing, Witness, 
Physical Abuse, 
Blood/Semen, Physical 
Examination ft Condition 
Report Made Under 
'What was your physical state afterwards?* 
'Are you sure you did not have bruises prior to 
incidence?* 
'Is it true you had severe bleeding and bruises?' 
E. Consent 
Questions 
"What did you feel towards X right afterwards?' 
'ttty did you stay to have a beer with X after?* 
'You refused to have a beer with X after* right? 
V. PRESENT TIME: 
A. Information 
Questions 
"How do you feel today about the incidence?" 
'Is it true that the thought of the incidence 
doesn't bother you ?' 
"This has been the most traumatic event in your 
life, hasn't it?" 
B. Credibility 
Questions 
0 
+ 
'Have you been consistent with your story?' 
'Hasn't your story changed slightly?' 
'You are still receiving counselling* correct?" 
C. Past History 
Questions 
'Are you presently involved with someone?' 
'You still have many sexual partners?' 
'You still have difficulties with sexual 
relations* correct?* 
D. Corroboration 
Questions 
'How do you feel facing X today?' 
'Why did you have difficulties recognizing 
the exhibits?' 
'You are still receiving treatment for 
your injuries* correct?* 
E. Consent 
Questions 
'Could you become friends with X again?' 
'You continued contact with X* didn't you?' 
STAGE OF INCIDENCE AND EXAMPLE OF CONTENT QUESTION TONE EXAMPLE OF POSSIBLE Manual Page 6 
CATE60RY OF EACH STAGE OF CATEGORIES (+ Credit Victim) QUESTION 
(- Discredit Victim) 
(0 Neutral) 
+ 'The sight of X still repulses you* doesn't it?' 
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Appendix G: Physical Assault Manual 
TRIAL OBSERVATION DATA SHEET INSTRUCTIONS: PHYSICAL ASSAULT 
1. Complete information as to trial characteristics on front page. 
2. Circle whether the defense lawyer or crown prosecutor is posing question on each data sheet. 
3. Write posed question as completely as possible. A dash < — ) is to be used to indicate a new question. Questions 
'chunked' together by the lawyer are to be separated ONLY if enough time was given to the witness to 
answer. If time was not given, use a commas to indicate one single lengthy question. 
4. Indicate the emotional tone of the question using 0, + or -. 
0 -Neutral question 
+ -Question used to credit victim 
- -Question used to discredit victim 
5. Tick off which stage the question is about. 
6. Tick off the type of question. 
7. Complete outcome of trial on front page. 
DEFINITION OF STAGES OF INCIDENCE 
I. PRIOR TO INCIDENCE: 
Focuses on descriptive and factual information prior to victim even meeting accused. 
II. MEETIN6 ACCUSED: 
Focuses on actual time of victim meeting accused. 
III. INCIDENCE SCENE: 
Focuses on actual events of the assault, i.e., unwanted contact. 
IV. AFTER INCIDENCE: 
Focuses on when victim and accused are separated, getting away from scene of assault and reporting procedures. 
V. PRESENT TIME: 
Focuses on preliminary hearing* court procedures ft present time. Also* questions asked in present tense by the 
lawyers and answered in present tense by the victim. 
VI. OUTCOME: 
Focuses on the verdict and sentence given to accused. 
DEFINITION OF CATEGORIES 
A. INFORMATION QUESTIONS: 
Any question that gives background as to the personality characteristics and life-style of the victim. Any question that 
details the scene of events in terms of time, scenery and action. 
B. CREDIBILITY QUESTIONS: 
Any question that validates or invalidates victim's story and credits or discredits victim's character. 
C. PAST HISTORY QUESTIONS: 
Any question that exposes the victim's moral character and past experiences (sexuality, fighting, etc.) 
D. CORROBORATION QUESTIONS: 
Any question that focuses on actual physical evidence that is brought to present at court, i.e., witnesses* torn clothing ft 
exhibits. 
E. CONSENT QUESTIONS: 
Any question that indicates whether the victim desired and willingly allowed or actively resisted the contact with accused. 
F. OTHER QUESTIONS: 
Any question that does not fit into the above categories. 
STAGE OF INCIDENCE AND 
CATEGORY OF EACH STAGE 
EXAMPLE OF CONTENT 
OF CATEGORIES 
QUESTION TONE 
(+ Credit Victim) 
(- Discredit Victim) 
(0 Neutral) 
EXAMPLE OF POSSIBLE 
QUESTION 
Manual Page 2 
PRIOR TO INCIDENCE: 
A. Information 
Questions 
Indentification 
of Victim 
'What is your name?' 
'Is it true you work in a bar?' 
'At the time of the incidence you were only 17 
years old?' 
B. Credibility 
Questions 
Social Stability 
Personal Relationship 
Stability 
Relationship with 
Family 
Relationship with 
Friends 
Drug Problem 
Alcohol Problem 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
'How long have you worked at your present job?' 
'Is it true that you have not held a job down 
for longer than three months this year?' 
'Is it true you have been working at your present 
job for over three years?* 
'Are you at present involved with someone?* 
'Is it true that you are presently separated?" 
'You have been married for over three years 
and have two children* correct?" 
'How close are you with your family?' 
'Is it true you left home at any early age? 
'Your family has been very supportive of you 
during this difficult time* haven't they?' 
'Do you have alot of friends?' 
M s it true you prefer to be a loner?' 
'Your friends have bee very supportive during 
during this time* haven't they?' 
'Have you ever experimented with drugs?' 
'You were once a regular user of marijuana?' 
'You were never involved with drugs?' 
"Do you drink?' 
'Is it true you drink regularly?" 
"Is it true you only drink on special 
occasions?" 
C. Past History Frequency* 
Importance of ft 
When Started 
"Do you have a criminal record?" 
'You have been involved in assaults numerous 
times before* correct?' 
'You have no criminal record* have you?' 
D. Corroboration 'Did you know if X carried a weapon?" 
STAGE OF INCIDENCE AND 
CATEGORY OF EACH STAGE 
EXAMPLE OF CONTENT 
OF CATEGORIES 
QUESTION TONE 
(+ Credit Victim) 
(- Discredit Victim) 
(0 Neutral) 
EXAMPLE OF POSSIBLE 
QUESTION 
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Questions 'You already knew X was in the habit of carrying 
a gun* did'nt you?* 
'You had no way of knowing if X was armed* 
did you?' 
E. Consent 
Questions 
Prior Relationship 
with Accused 
'Were you acquainted with X before?* 
'Is'nt it true that* not only did you dislike X 
but were on unfriendly terms with him?' 
'You did not know of X before* did you?' 
II. MEETING ACCUSED 
A. Information 
Questions 
Time, Scene, 
Action of Others, 
Action of Self ft 
Meeting Accused 
'What time was it then?' 
'Why did you not leave when you had the 
chance?" 
'How did you try to avoid X?' 
B. Credibility 
Questions 
0 'What did you say to X?' 
'Why did you swear and threaten X?' 
'You tried hard to ignore X, didn't you?' 
C. Past History 
Questions 
'Did you discuss your previous fight with each 
other?' 
'You had wanted to fight with X before, hadn't 
you?" 
"You told X that you didn't want to fight with him 
like you had before, correct?" 
D. Corroboration 
Questions 
Action of Others 'Where were other people?" 
'Why did you not ask your friends to help?" 
'Others were trying to help you* correct?" 
E. Consent 
Questions 
Emotions Felt* 
Nature of Contact* 
Desire to Increase/ 
Decrease Contact 
"What were you feeling?" 
'Is it true you wanted to have it out with X?' 
'Is it true you did not want to fight X?' 
III. INCIDENCE SCENE 
A. Information Description of 
1S3 
UJ 
'What happened then?" 
STAGE OF INCIDENCE AND 
CATEGORY OF EACH STAGE 
EXAMPLE OF CONTENT 
OF CATEGORIES 
QUESTION TONE 
(+ Credit Victim) 
<- Discredit Victim) 
(0 Neutral) 
EXAMPLE OF POSSIBLE 
QUESTION 
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Questions Incidence "Why were you alone with X ?' 
'You remember exactly what happened, 
don't you?" 
B. Credibility 
Questions 
'At the time of the fight* what was your 
condition?" 
"You were very drunk at the time of the fight 
weren't you?' 
'You were sober at the time of the fight* right?" 
C. Past History 
Questions 
'How did this fight differ from the ones before?' 
'Unlike previous fights, you tried to severly 
hurt X, didn't you?' 
'Unlike previous fights, you tried to deflect the 
blows and get away?' 
D. Corroboration 
Questions 
Type of Force 
Applied ft Recieved 
"How were you forced to submit?" 
"You permanently scared X didn't you?" 
'You broke your arm in your effort to deflect 
the blows?" 
E. Consent 
Questions 
IV. AFTER INCIDENCE: 
A. Information 
Questions 
B. Credibility 
Questions 
C. Past History 
Questions 
Emotions Felt, 
Removal of Clothing ft 
Possible Escape 
Interaction/Physical 
Contact with Accused 
After Incidence 
Reasons for not 
Escaping Sooner, 
Route Taken ft 
Reporting Incidence 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
'What were you feeling?' 
'You were getting really angry at X, correct?' 
'You were planning your escape?' 
'What happened after attack?' 
'Why did you allow X to contact you again?' 
'Is it true you tried to avoid contact again?' 
'In what condition did you leave incidence?' 
'Why did you not report sooner?' 
"So you asked the first person you saw for help?' 
"Did you get into any other fight since?" 
'You got into another fight after* didn't you?' 
'You avoided even the friends of X after?" 
STAGE OF INCIDENCE AND 
CATEGORY OF EACH STAGE 
D. Corroboration 
Questions 
E. Consent 
Questions 
V. PRESENT TIME! 
A. Information 
Questions 
B. Credibility 
Questions 
C. Past History 
Questions 
D. Corroboration 
Questions 
E. Consent 
Questions 
EXAMPLE OF CONTENT 
OF CATEGORIES 
Clothing, Witness, 
Physical Abuse, 
Hood, Physical 
Examination 1 Condition 
Report Hade Under 
QUESTION TONE 
(• Credit Victim) 
<- Discredit Victim) 
(1 Neutral) 
1 
1 
1 
• 
1 
• 
1 
• 
1 
1 
'What was your physical state afterwards?* 
'Are you sure you did not have bruises prior to 
incidence?' 
'Is it true you had severe bleeding and bruises?' 
'What did you feel towards I afterwards?' 
'Why did you stay to have a beer with I after?' 
'You refused to have a beer with X after, 
•didn't you?' 
•How do you feel today about the incidence?* 
'It does not really bother you today, does it?' 
'You cannot get it out of your mind, can you? * 
'Have you been consistent with your story?' 
'Hasn't your story changed slightly?' 
'You still try to avoid X, correct?' 
• • 
'Didn't you get into another fight last week?' 
• • 
'Do your injuries still bother you?' 
'Why did you have difficulty recognizing the 
the exhibits? 
•You are still receiving treatment, correct?' 
'Could you become friends with X again?* 
'You continued contact with X, didn't you?' 
'You don't like to hold grudges, do you?* 
Ul 
